"KHAN POWER OF THE KAZAKH: RANK AND/OR POSITION"
BYKOV ANDREY YURIEVICH
Doctor of Historical Sciences, PhD / Doctor of Philosophy
Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences
When determining the level of development of society, the relations of groups and individuals within it and their interaction with external actors, the question of the system of organization of power in a given socio-political entity is of great importance. An essential criterion for the development of socio- and politogenesis is statehood. As a rule, three signs are distinguished as the main ones: territorial division, systematic taxation, management that has become a separate sphere of activity, and the existence of a bureaucratic apparatus. Population density, the level of urbanization, the development of writing, fixed legislation, a rather complex socio-political stratification of society, combined with the exploitation of various forms, etc. are put forward as additional criteria [Kradin N.N., 1991; Kubbel L.E.; Engels F., Earle T., Fried M., Service E. et al.]. The main and auxiliary typing tools are very vague and conditional, and there is no generally accepted systematization of them. Even more confusing is the political evolution of nomadic societies, which are characterized by a low level of urbanization (or lack of their own urban culture), weak economic specialization, tribalism, adherence to adat, low density and high geographical mobility of the population, etc.
It is natural that the problem of assessing the level of organization of power in nomadic societies is one of the debatable in modern political anthropology and oriental studies. On it, researchers express different points of view. A number of authors advocate the idea of a fairly high level of development of social relations among nomads and the resulting high degree of property differentiation and social polarization. This group of scientists concludes that the pastoral peoples have such a system of organizing power-subjugation relations, which should be characterized as a state system. In particular, the Kazakh khanates of the XV-XVIII centuries. are often considered as states of a feudal or semi-feudal (patriarchal-feudal) type [Vladimirtsov B.Ya., Materials of the United ... and others]. To a large extent, the dominance of such a position was influenced by the formational approach. The lexicon of established definitions reflected in the sources and previous studies, as well as the use in colloquial speech of such concepts as "empire", "state", "khanate", "ruler", "ruler" pushed the researchers to such a solution to the issue. They have analogies and direct lexical coincidences of definitions in the thesaurus of scientists, which describe societies with a pronounced institutional structure of power and nomadic socio-political formations, and their meanings are often superimposed or identified.
Other researchers, on the contrary, come to almost complete denial of the existence of significant economic and, as a result, social differentiation in the society of nomads. Researchers who adhere to this position note qualitative differences in attitudes towards property, power, and other categories in settled agricultural and nomadic communities. It is emphasized that socio-economic, and after them political changes in the nomadic culture occurred only under the influence of urban civilization. Nomadism had no prospects for socio-economic progress, being a dead end branch of the development of world civilization [Markov G.E.; Kalinovskaya K.P.].
The third group of authors also comes to the conclusion that there are no prospects for internal socio-economic growth and the development of nomadic societies. However, at the same time, the evolution of their political system is recorded, which changed in direct dependence and interconnection with neighboring political formations of settled agricultural societies. In particular, it was emphasized that statehood among nomads periodically arose and then disappeared again, which had no effect on the level of their socio-economic development, the development of economic specialization and the system of relations within society. The researchers noted that “politogenesis among nomads was a reversible, cyclical process. The periods of centralization and flourishing of the steppe empires gave way to the subsequent segmentation and death of the political formations of the nomads” [Kradin N.N., 1995, p. 196]. It was shown that exploitation in nomadic society was carried out in relation to foreigners, and in this case the entire society acted as a “class” of exploiters [Kradin N.N., 1990; Kradin N.N., 1992 and others].
An example of qualitatively different approaches to solving the issue of organizing power in a nomadic community is the assessment of the level of development of hierarchical structures among the Kazakhs on the eve and in the initial period of joining the Russian Empire. To a large extent, variations in assessments are determined by differences in research methodologies and paradigms, as well as by the authors' modern political predilections and their ethno-cultural identification. Without going into the details of the discussion on this issue, we only note that in this case, too, scientists defend the position of the need to assess both the state (institutional) and potestar levels of the organization of power in Kazakh society. To a large extent, the first approach was reflected in the publication of the second and third volumes of the new five-volume "History of Kazakhstan" [History of Kazakhstan ..., 1999; History of Kazakhstan ..., 2000] and a number of other publications, published mainly in Kazakhstan since the mid-1980s.
In our opinion, the arguments of researchers who do not consider the system of organization of power in the Kazakh society as a state system are more convincing. We agree with the point of view of V.A. Moiseev, who emphasizes that the Kazakh Khanate is a conditional name, the Kazakh society on the eve and in the initial period of joining Russia did not have its own statehood [Moiseev V.A., 1995, p. 22-26]. Numerous social groups of this society, whose functions included management, were poorly specialized and did not stand out from the main sphere of life - the nomadic pastoral economy. The main forms of social organization here were not the state and law, but the community and custom [Bykov A.Yu., 2003, p. 9-20]. It is significant that even in the second half of the XIX century. Orenburg military governor N.A. Kryzhanovsky noted that all the actions of the Kazakhs are committed “on the basis of either family ties or tribal enmity” [RGIA. F. 1291. Op. 8. D. 35. 1865. L. 1-1 rev.; Archive of SPb II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 83/1. L. 12].
Different approaches to assessing the level of socio-political development of the Kazakh society on the eve of the start of joining Russia were reflected in the qualitative assessment of both the very fact that the Kazakhs accepted Russian citizenship, and the typification and periodization of the further history of the Steppe Territory as part of the Russian Empire. So, I.V. Erofeeva believes that the first period of Kazakhstan's accession to Russia should be considered as the entry of Kazakh rulers into vassal dependence on the rulers of Russia, and she calls the stage itself "the era of the spread of the formal legal suzerainty of the Russian Empire to the Kazakh population of the Younger and Middle Zhuzes." Thus, relations between Russia and Kazakh zhuzes are viewed through the prism of relations between the rulers of feudal states. As a result, the fact of accession is estimated by the scientist as a fact of patronage typical of the international law of the Middle Ages [Erofeeva IV, 1999; Masanov N.E. et al., 2001]. The same approach is used by J.M. Tulibayeva, who gives similar assessments of the relations of the Kazakh rulers not only with Russia, but also with the Central Asian states. By analogy with the Central Asian possessions well known to the author, she interprets socio-political relations within the Kazakh society as “... a feudal fragmented state, consisting of several khanates. Within the khanates there were sultan's possessions, which, in turn, were divided into Biy's possessions” [Tulibaeva Zh.M., p. 76]. The opinion of Zh.M. Dzhampeisova, who believes that the presence of the Sultan's estate does not reflect the presence of feudal land holdings, but only characterizes the Kazakh society as socially stratified [Dzhampeisova Zh.M., p. fifteen]. The second period of I.V. Erofeeva calls "the era of the gradual establishment of the state-political protectorate of the Russian autocracy over the Kazakh zhuzes." This period, in her opinion, lies within the chronological framework of the middle of the 18th - early 19th centuries. [Masanov N.E. et al., 2001, p. 172-175]. However, here, too, the relationship took the form of a vassal-suzerain relationship. Undoubtedly, the synchronization of periodization by I.V. Erofeeva with the generally recognized periodization of the presence of the institute of khan power in Kazakhstan. Moreover, the very fact of its presence allows, in her opinion, to draw a conclusion about the existence of statehood among the Kazakhs in the above years. At the same time, this also allows us to conclude that the Russian policy towards the Kazakhs did not have colonial features. This point of view was expressed more clearly by K.A. Zhirenchin. He agrees with the assessment of relations between Russia and the Kazakhs as a relationship of vassalage. Moreover, he notes that it was the elimination of the institution of khan power, and with it the Kazakh statehood, that predetermined “for a historically long period, the political and legal status of Kazakhstan as a colony of the Russian Empire” [Zhirenchin K.A., p. 9]. The same author notes that a vassal form of dependence implies less independence than a protectorate [Zhirenchin K.A., p. 99-100].
In the works of other modern Kazakh researchers, one can find a slightly different assessment of the relationship between Russia and Kazakh rulers and the legal status of Kazakh lands and Kazakhs within the Russian Empire. In particular, A.K. Abilev and E.A. Abilev believe that relations between Russia and the Kazakhs subject to Abulkhair Khan "were built on the basis of a protectorate, a form of colonial dependence, when a dependent state retains sovereignty in all areas except foreign policy" [Kuzembaiuly A., Abil E., p. 27]. In this case, these two approaches are united by the fact that they both take into account the existence of statehood among the Kazakhs on the eve and at a certain stage of joining Russia. The difference between them is that the first approach does not consider the early stages of Kazakhstan's accession to Russia as a colonial expansion.
The third option for assessing the accession of Kazakhstan to Russia is an approach that does not take into account in this process the very fact of the presence or absence of khan power among the Kazakhs (it is simply an illustrative fact that does not have serious epistemological significance), as well as their desires and foreign policy preferences. In the last two decades, many works on Kazakh studies have been published, which interpret the accession of Kazakhstan to Russia as the conquest of the former by the former. One of the categorical innovations can be considered the introduction of such a concept as ethnocide, which is used in relation to the policy of Russia and the Soviet Union towards the Kazakhs. As a radical version of the implementation of the concept, one can cite the works of A. Seydimbek, in one of which the author states: “The Kazakh statehood in 1822 was forcibly liquidated, more precisely, destroyed. From that moment on, the most gifted sons and daughters of the Kazakh people stopped dying a natural death” [Seidimbek A., p. 554]. This approach is most fully reflected in the works of M.Zh. Abdirov [Abdirov M.Zh., 1994; Abdirov M.Zh., 2000 and others]. This approach finds methodological substantiation in the recently popular hypothesis about the formation of Russian imperialism in the era of Ivan IV's territorial acquisitions.
All three concepts are united by an assessment of the trend in the development of Russian-Kazakh relations towards the unification of the management of the Kazakh population within the Russian Empire with other social, political and ethnographic groups. And here, too, the fact of the liquidation of the institution of khan's power often turns out to be a milestone. The following explanation is quite typical: “Having eliminated the Kazakh khanates, removed the Kazakh sultans from control, the tsarist government thereby destroyed even the appearance of state independence of the Kazakhs and turned Kazakhstan into an ordinary province of the Russian Empire” [Tulibayeva Zh.M., p. 83].
In our opinion, the popularity of the topic and the conclusions of researchers are largely predetermined by the state ideology of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The President of independent Kazakhstan in one of his many works “In the Stream of History” concludes without sufficient argumentation that the Russian Empire liquidated the statehood of the Kazakhs, replacing them with tribal institutions that performed a disintegrating function. ON THE. Nazarbaev writes: “The system of alien national-state institutions did not develop the national unity of the Kazakhs, but, on the contrary, in every possible way used the institutions of tribal division as mechanisms for the disintegration of the nation” [Nazarbaev N.A., p. 47]. To substantiate the long history of the existence of statehood, sources were attracted and are attracted (or are fabricated), with references to the existence of the Kazakh Khanate. At the same time, the khan's title was, as it were, a marker of this statehood. According to the prevailing ideology, the longer the historical period of existence of the khan's power, the more prepared and objective was the appearance on the world map of a new independent state - the Republic of Kazakhstan. The search for a new identity stimulated the assertion of the concept of independent centuries-old statehood of the Kazakhs. In 1996, in Almaty, with the support of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, a major international scientific and practical conference "The Evolution of the Statehood of Kazakhstan" was held, timed to coincide with the 450th anniversary of the formation of the Kazakh state. With regard to the integration of the Kazakhs into the Russian Empire and the elimination of the institution of khan power, it was stated, in particular: “Since the construction of the first military fortifications (“military bases” in modern geopolitical language) and especially after the defeat of the movement of K. Kasymov (1847) we can talk about the end of the Kazakh state sovereignty, which lasted about 400 years, and the period of total colonization of Kazakhstan by Russia" [Khamzeeva B., Zainullina G., p. 360].
In our opinion, the issue discussed below about the essence of the khan's power and its constituent part - the elimination of the institution of khan's power in Kazakh society by the Russian colonial authorities should not be understood as an illustration of the characteristics of the forms of existence of the statehood of the Kazakhs and its elimination within the colonial system of the Russian Empire. On the contrary, the process of elimination of traditional institutions, their replacement by official bureaucratic structures, which took place in Kazakhstan under the influence of the Russian Empire, characterizes the formation and development of the colonial administration system. The result of this is the instillation of political culture and the development of institutional (statist) ideas among the Kazakhs. Moreover, it was the unification of the Kazakh patronymic units within the Russian Empire that limited particularism and zhuz separatism, which contributed to the national consolidation of the Kazakhs.
In the Kazakh society of this period, there were several social groups that exercised power. First of all, these included Genghisides (torah), or ak-suyek (white bone). They formed a special caste with obligatory endogamy for women. The estate formed by the tore was called the Sultan. The supreme rulers - khans - in the Kazakh society of the XVIII-XIX centuries. were elected by the traditional nobility only from among the sultans. The powers of the khan and sultans in different chronological periods ranged from expressing only formal external respect up to the application of the death penalty. The latter was more of an exception to customary legal practice than a regular and typical phenomenon. In general, the functions of khans and sultans were reduced mainly to the regulation of relations with external forces, both fellow tribesmen and foreigners. One of the documents noted that the sultans were elected “not at all for governance, but as solicitors for external relations” [RGIA. F. 1284. Op. 223. D. 85. 1886. L. 19 rev.].
The power of the Torah, as, indeed, of other groups, was based on custom and legitimized by adat. Personal authority and charisma were of great importance. Typical is the report of the Orenburg expedition of border affairs to Chancellor Count A.R. Vorontsov: “And when these foremen, khan’s children and other sultans, in the case of any popular demand, serve them at will, but they, the Kirghiz-kaisaka (Kazakhs - A.B.), love and revere them, but otherwise neglected” [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 106. L. 8]. Similar information was deposited in the documents of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs. In particular, the following report on the organization of governance in the Kazakh steppe is very characteristic: people do not acquire strength. Just as a khanate is obtained from them from soltans, for none of the simple ones are made into khans, by choice, for the most part, one that is more agile than others, so their strength among the people depends for the most part on their agility "[Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS . F. 36. Op. 1. D. 439. L. 5v.].
Kazakh society has not developed mechanisms for regulating social practice that are not related to customary law, custom or precedent. There was no bureaucracy, organically unacceptable due to the peculiarities of the economic structure, the high geographical mobility of the population and the lack of a sufficient share of the surplus product. The latter was due to the high degree of dependence of production on external conditions (jutes, epizootics, wars, barymta, etc.). This also predetermined the irregularity of fiscal collections and their unlimited size. P.I. Rychkov reported on this occasion: “Neither the khans nor the saltans receive income from certain people elected from the people; contains himself more from his own savings with voluntary gifts and booty in the war” [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 106. L. 11-12]. The conclusion of V.V. cannot be considered completely fair. Grigoriev that the Kazakhs “never and nowhere paid any tribute to their khans” [RGIA. F. 853. Op. 1. 1842-1851 D. 22. L. 42v.]. In our opinion, the conclusion of A.P. Chuloshnikov that fees and offerings in favor of the Kazakh khans (khanlyk) were in the nature of voluntary offerings [Chuloshnikov A.P., p. 216]. Despite the debatability of the issue, it seems that the rites of mutual assistance, mutual responsibility and other numerous institutions were not a vestige of obsolete social relations in Kazakh society. On the contrary, they played an important role in the organization and functioning of the system of social relations. The most indicative in this case is the attitude of nomadic Kazakhs to property, which was often perceived by the owners of this or that property as a temporary phenomenon. In addition, the clan, aul, family had significant property rights. Even in the middle of the XIX century. the Saratov merchant Zharkov, who visited the Kazakh steppe, reported that rich Kazakhs not only have debts, but also “kibitka money (kibitka tax is a form of Russian taxation of nomads - A.B.) pay for their poor people and correct their various needs” [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAN. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 83/1. L. 72].
Political activity in the Kazakh society did not stand out as an independent sphere of human activity. Even such a strong ruler as Khan Abulkhair was forced to engage in economic activities, and in order to solve foreign policy actions, he was forced to personally ride to the rulers and batyrs. So, J. Castle left evidence confirmed by other sources that in June 1736, when trying to organize a raid on the Ural border line, the khan of the Younger Zhuz “led on his horse to Dzhambek Batur (Dzhanibek-batyr - A.B.), which is about two days away" [Kastle J., p. 17].
During the growing real or virtual external danger, khans and sultans periodically made attempts to usurp power, but even they were not successful. Periods of foreign policy stabilization were accompanied by a weakening of the power of the khan and sultans. However, even with the tangible power of one or another Genghisides, tribal institutions limited it in every possible way. The following fact is interesting: in the XVIII century. khans Nuraly and Ablai were brought to the court of the biys, and both were obliged to pay kun (paying cattle for blood is the most common form of punishment for such crimes), as well as Sultan Barak, who was accused of killing Khan Abulkhair, but acquitted by the court of biys. Ivan Shangin reported that Khan Abulkhair was also sentenced to the trial of biys and the payment of a fine.
There were several groups of traditional nobility from among the black bone (kara-suyek). These included batyrs, tarkhans, foremen, bai and bii. The latter, resolving issues of customary legal proceedings, and often economic and social organization, were closest in their functions to the bureaucracy layer, but even they should not be classified in this way. They were associated with this practice not by law, but by custom, not by political institutions, but by tribal relations. Quite often, in sources of various origins, one can find explanations similar to the following: “The power of the biy is very relative and conditional. Biya is obeyed when his conviction coincides with the conviction of the crowd of his relatives; the bey's order means nothing if the elders in the families do not approve of them” [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 83/1. D. 26. L. 508-509]. In addition, there was always an overt or covert confrontation between the Kara- and Ak-Suyek nobility. This was shown in sufficient detail and convincingly at the end of the 19th century. A. Nikolsky [Archive of the St. Petersburg Branch of the Institute of Orthopedics RAS. Once. III. Op. 1. D. 48. L. 5 rev. – 37v.] and other authors. The confrontation weakened the positions of both those and other social groups with potestarno-political powers, strengthening communal, tribal and tribal institutions, primarily the role of the people's assembly or kurultai.
Thus, the Kazakh society on the eve and during the beginning of joining the Russian Empire was at the stage preceding the state, in other words, tribal. The institutions that regulated relations between members of the social collective were not legitimized by the social contract and written law. Accordingly, the so-called "owners" or "owners", often mentioned in the sources, were not analogues of state (bureaucratic) bodies, and the semantic coincidence of such concepts as "khan" and "sultan" with the concepts of other entities, for example, the Ottoman Empire or empire of Genghis Khan, did not mean the coincidence of their functions and powers. In our opinion, the Kazakh khans and sultans before the inclusion of their part in the system of Russian socio-political stratification are not positions, but titles. Even the highest dignitaries of Russia were misled by semantic coincidences. An anecdotal incident of that time is known. One of the courtiers tried to give an order to the Kazakh khan (under whom, according to reports, the sultans were, and the Kazakh ruler himself was under Russian citizenship) so that the khan would give an order to the Turkish sultan.
Since the formal inclusion of the Younger Kazakh zhuz in 1731 into the Russian Empire, the process of co-opting Kazakh rulers into the imperial political hierarchy began. Moreover, initially (and this is quite understandable) they were included with the same titles (here are the same names) that they had in the traditional structure of the Kazakh society: the khan remained the khan, the sultan - the sultan. However, the new role played by the Kazakh rulers in the face of Russia had a significant impact on the change in their status. There were no analogues of Kazakh institutions in the Russian political and genealogical structures; there simply were no such titles. The inclusion of part of the Kazakh nobility in the empire did not lead to a change in the hierarchy of ranks in the empire. On the contrary, the new role of the khan and a number of sultans turned out to be associated with the obligation to perform a number of functions that are characteristic of persons in the public service. The title of Khan gradually, at least from the point of view of the Russian authorities, began to be perceived precisely as a position. The Kazakhs still perceived this institution in the traditional sense.
Extremely indicative in this regard is the correspondence between the Russian authorities and Khan Abulkhair regarding the attacks of the Kazakhs of the Younger Zhuz on merchant caravans, as well as on Russian loyal subjects of the Bashkirs, Kalmyks and Ural Cossacks. The Russian authorities demanded an end to such actions, otherwise threatening Abulkhair with his removal, i.e. de facto dismissal. So, in the instructions of the Senate and the Collegium of Foreign Affairs for the foreman A.I. Tevkelev dated January 31, 1747, it was noted: if the khan fails to fulfill the indicated requirements, it is necessary “to set aside the evo (Abulkhair - A.B.) from the khanate, and instead of choosing the evo, make the khan from benevolent elders” [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 27. L. 13; AVPRI Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. F. 122. 1743. D. 3. L. 120v.]. Abulkhair, explaining to the Russian government his impotence and impossibility to stop such actions, wrote to the Empress: “... Our people are like wild animals ... and this Kirghiz-Kaisak people were disgusting to me” [KRO, p. 97]. That is, Abulkhair referred to his status as a khan in the potestary structure - to the title, and the Russian authorities focused on his functional duties.
By opposing the Kazakh sultans and khans to each other, the Russian government actually stimulated the latent phase of the conflict within the Kazakh society. By managing the conflict, the Russian authorities could control the general course of political processes without the large-scale use of military force, directing them in an acceptable direction for themselves. At the same time, the threat of separatism and armed uprisings against Russia came from the Kazakh rulers for a long time. Under such conditions, and also in connection with the gradual deeper integration of the outskirts into the general imperial infrastructure, the question of changing the management system in the Kazakh steppe and limiting internal self-government sounded more and more urgent. The first steps towards changing this situation were attempts to eliminate the institution of khan power in its traditional perception, i.e. as a title.
Gifts or rather bribes issued by the Russian authorities, taking on a regular character, became payment for the execution of orders, gradually turning into a salary. If at first the Russian authorities, fulfilling the requests of the Kazakh sultans, often passed the so-called "gifts" secretly, then gradually the nature of such offerings became fixed and carried out openly. More precisely, only a part of the amounts or goods in kind was transferred explicitly, the rest - secretly [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 36. Op. 1. D. 439. L. 32-32v. and etc.]. Here, by the way, the process of changing the perception of the custom by the Chingizids themselves, who sought to concentrate wealth in private property in this way, without showing its size of the corporation, can be traced. Orenburg chiefs - Governor-General I.I. Neplyuev and Major General A.I. Tevkelev wrote to the Collegium of Foreign Affairs in 1748: “When a salary is determined for the khan, then even if all the people wished to choose themselves without a decree of the khan, but that soltan, knowing that he would lose his e.i.v. the khanate will not accept mercy and salaries, and the foremen will not want their khan to be without a salary, for they have an ancient custom, as if he should share what he received with all the foremen” [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 63; AVPRI Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. F. 122. 1748. D. 3. L. 174 rev.]. Moreover, a number of difficult issues could be solved at that time only through regular payments. So, a quarrel with Khan Nuraly, caused by obscene abuse towards him of the Orenburg Governor-General Davydov, was stopped after they began to “give his brothers (Khan - A.B.) a salary in order to appease them” [Meyer L. , With. 14-15].
The Russian authorities realized that using the greed of certain circles of the Kazakh aristocracy was not a sufficient condition for maintaining their loyal obligations. In 1763, Catherine II wrote to the Orenburg vice-governor D.V. Volkov that “giving salaries to the Kyrgyz is not yet satisfied with the policy of arousing their love and inclination towards Russia” [IIB, p. 452], other measures are needed. The local Russian authorities understood the need to use traditional institutions to maintain relative stability and continuity in governance, but at the same time, the need for its gradual transformation, with a proposal about which they repeatedly went to the government. So, A.I. Tevkelev asked for permission from the government, so that the nomads “according to their current state, some rituals or orders should be reduced, and some should be added again” [MIB, p. 439]. Ultimately, it was necessary to strive to ensure that “the Kyrgyz people love Russia for Russia proper and little by little the rivers” [MIB, p. 447]. The search for ways to resolve these issues by representatives of the Orenburg administration proceeded in various, sometimes opposite, directions. One of them was proposed by P.I. Rychkov in a report with the characteristic title "The idea of the state of the Kirghiz-Kaisatsky hordes, and ways to bring them to a peaceful stay and to the performance of subordinate positions" (1774) [Archive of the St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 36. Op. 1. D. 438. L. 15v.]. It boiled down to the need to educate, first of all, the amanats - a likely reserve for the future bureaucratic apparatus from among the representatives of the traditional Kazakh nobility incorporated into Russian structures.
One of the means of realizing the strategic goals was the process of turning traditional titles into positions. The first step towards this was the formation of the financial dependence of a part of the Kazakh aristocracy on Russia. The second step was the development and bringing to the attention of applicants for the replacement of clear, very specific duties and powers of khans and sultans. They were obliged to take care of the protection of transit caravans, provide the provincial administration with information about the socio-political and economic situation in neighboring states, and promote security in the "border". In accordance with their official duties, they were responsible for their partial or complete failure to perform. So, for the loss of part of the property by the caravan, the sultans and the khan could lose part of their annual salary [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 36. Op. 1. D. 439. L. 33v. - 34, etc.], and for the insufficient provision of calm on the Russian-Kazakh "borders" and the raids of the Kazakhs on Russian settlements - positions [Archive of St. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 22. L. 47]. The first Orenburg Governor-General I.I. Neplyuev, justifying the expediency of Abulkhair’s removal, wrote about the possibility of rotation of khans and sultans: “If a khan who receives such a salary takes an evil intention, and it will be impossible to get and catch him, then he will immediately dismiss the salary determined for him and from the soltans of one reliable khan in his place and with a salary to determine ”[Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 63; AVPRI Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. F. 122. 1748. D. 3. L. 174-174v.]. On the contrary, the zealous performance of official duties by the Kazakhs was encouraged by an increase in the annual salary, the presentation of awards and transfer to other positions up to patronage when elected to the rank of khan. Of course, mutual gifts, a formal obligation to pay yasak were primarily a means of demonstrating the foreign policy dependence of the Kazakh rulers on Russia. However, it seems that from the very first moments of the formation of the imperial system, this was also an element of influence on the Kazakh population itself, the bulk of which perceived the first formal steps to join Kazakhstan to the Russian Empire very indifferently. The Russian side attached serious importance to this issue. A.I. Tevkelev, in particular, wrote that the Kazakhs, “hearing about such a salary [of Genghisides], admit that it is truly Russian citizenship” [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 63; AVPRI Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. F. 122. 1748 D. 3. L. 175].
The issue of assigning a regular regulated salary to Kazakh owners still requires its detailed study, since it sheds light on the formation of the mechanisms of the genesis and evolution of the colonial system of government of the Russian Empire. There were several points of view on this issue in the government. Initially, the prevailing opinion was that “it would not be worth determining the salary for the khan, since this would create a precedent, and the rulers of the Kalmyks and mountain peoples would demand the same” [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 64; AVPRI Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. F. 122. 1748. D. 3. L. 176]. The insistent requests of the Orenburg authorities, in the end, were supported on the condition that the involvement of Kazakh rulers in the service would increase Russia's trade turnover with the countries of Central Asia. Initially, the government considered the issuance of a salary precisely as a payment for service, and “although the khan himself is not obliged to come for an annual meeting (report - A.B.), he must send letters annually” [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 66; AVPRI Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. F. 122. 1748 D. 3. L. 177]. The payment of salaries to the Kazakh rulers, indeed, became a precedent, and such actions were also taken against the heterodox nobility of other ethnic groups of the empire, but this also contributed to the development of a new mechanism for co-opting allogenes into imperial structures and a certain unification of approaches to the implementation of interaction between the nobility of Orthodox and non-Orthodox peoples in composition of Russia.
The dependence of the Kazakh khans was emphasized by their confirmation by the Russian government, as well as the need to draw up periodic written reports, etc. This process was hampered by a number of objective circumstances: lack of experience in bureaucracy among the Kazakhs, low educational level, the problem of choosing the language of communication, and a number of others. In the gradually created administrative bodies, a lot of papers were accumulated, requiring the solution of issues, etc. Naturally, there was red tape and conditions for the flourishing of corruption. Great difficulties were associated with the high geographical mobility of the population, which made it difficult for the functioning of the fiscal and police systems, as well as with the differences in the mentality of the Russian officials and the bulk of Kazakh nomads. However, even these difficulties did not become an obstacle to the formation and development, qualitative and quantitative growth of the colonial bureaucratic apparatus in the Kazakh steppe.
After the death of Khan Abulkhair, Tevkelev wrote to the government that among the Kazakhs it was expedient “to solicit the chief khan by decree; because if one of them is made by decree, he can remember mercy. In addition, representatives of the Orenburg administration predicted that “from now on, that order will become a custom” [AVPRI MFA RF. F. 122. Kar.15. 1748 D. 8. L. 240]. The Russian authorities, during the elections for the khanate, sought to support the creatures of relatively weak, weak-willed sultans. They became puppets in the hands of the government and the provincial administration. If the Kazakhs elected a strong, masterful sultan, he was not recognized as such by the Russian authorities. This happened with the non-recognition of the sultans of Karatai, Aryngazy, Kaip-Gali, Kenesary, Abulgazy in the khan's dignity. Only eight years after the election, Ablai was approved in the rank of khan. The government needed executors of its will, in other words, bureaucrats, and not charismatic leaders, which were the khans by title. In parallel, the government continued to oppose each other both the dynastic branches of the Genghisides and individual sultans and khans. In one of the instructions of the middle of the XVIII century. it was noted that “their current form of government, due to the savagery of the people and the situation of both hordes (the Younger and Middle Zhuz - A.B.), for the highest e.i.v. interests is what it should always be. For the stronger the khans, the greater the difficulty in subduing them. It seems that the best way is to support them in their current measure, not allowing either side to either struggle or become very weak” [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 92-93; AVPRI Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. F. 122. Kar. 17. 1748. D. 3. L. 233v.].
The first experience of interference by the Russian authorities in the process of electing a khan by the Kazakhs was the election of a khan after the death of Abulkhair, who was killed by the Sultan of the Middle Zhuz Barak. The Russian authorities supported the candidacy of Abulkhair's eldest son, Sultan Nuraly. “It was necessary to choose a khan in his place (Abulkhair - A.B.), then in order for the new khan tol and as a loan to the local side, diligence was put into choosing the current Nurali Khan as a khan ... ”[Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 36. Op. 1. D. 439. L. 32]. He was officially approved for a salary of 600 rubles in silver, of which 400 rubles were secretly issued. As an attribute of power, a saber was handed over, and “200 rubles each were assigned to his two brothers Erali and Aichuvak Soltan ... Eralius recently ... [for] efforts in escorting caravans and another 150 rubles were added” [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology. F. 36. Op. 1. D. 439. L. 33]. Moreover, the Orenburg administration managed to get a written request from the khan to approve him in this dignity. On October 17, 1748, Nurali sent a letter addressed to the empress with the following content: “According to your advice ... all the noble biys gathered to become khans elected me, and although I remove this khan’s rule on myself, only without a special e.i.v. the highest decree to join the khanate and not be able to be the main khan ”[AVPRI MFA RF. F. 122. Kar. 17. 1748. D. 8. L. 21-21v.]. It is clear that for Nuraly this letter did not have the significance that the Russian authorities attached to this fact. Since, as T.I. Sultanov, the Kazakhs perceived joining under the protectorate of Russia as a reversible step, considering the possibility of its termination in a convenient case [Russia, the West and the Muslim East…, p. 19]. The Russian administration, however, proceeded from the norms of European law and subsequently used such official documents as a legal precedent that imposed obligations.
Nuraly's attempts to pursue a relatively independent foreign policy, which, to a certain extent, succeeded by his father and a number of other rulers, ran into opposition from the Russian authorities. This was expressed both in open confrontation and in the failure to provide assistance to the new khan in the implementation of his initiatives. For example, the Orenburg administration did not support the claims of the Khan of the Younger Zhuz (confirmed in the status of the Khan of the Kazakhs to maintain tension between the two branches of the Kazakh Chingizids - the Zhadigids and the Osekids) to receive the khan's dignity in Khiva and the Karakalpaks, did not provide assistance in his attempts to weaken the power of Batyr in the generation of the Alimuly of the Younger Zhuz and the power of Barak in the Middle Zhuz during the day, etc.
The authority of the khan in traditional Kazakh society largely depended on how successfully he contributed to the expansion of the range of nomads, the development of trade with neighboring settled regions, from where the nomads received the necessary agricultural products and handicraft goods, and also on how successful were his predatory raids. In the first years of his reign, Nuraly failed to fully demonstrate these qualities, as a result, his power was nominal. Fearing competition from the generation of Zhadigids, as well as seeking to expand trade relations with the Urals and Siberian settlements, Nuraly was objectively forced to look for ways to expand contacts with the Russian administration, in whose person he could find support for a number of his initiatives and the support of his own fragile power. For a long time, the Russian authorities maintained rather cool relations with Nuraly, relying on the sultans of the Middle Zhuz - first Barak, and then Ablai. The reason for this lay in the fact that the Middle Zhuz was more numerous, and the economic well-being of its population was higher. In addition, he occupied an important strategic position, being a certain soft buffer between Russia and Dzungaria, and after its defeat, between the Russian and Qing empires. In addition, the sultans of the Middle Zhuz largely controlled the caravan routes to Khiva and Bukhara [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 36. Op. 1. D. 438. L. 153].
The situation began to qualitatively change from 1755. The outbreak of the Bashkir rebellion forced the local Orenburg authorities to seek closer cooperation with the rulers of the Little Zhuz, primarily with Nuraly. The desire to improve relations was mutual. Governor General I.I. Neplyuev allowed the Kazakh sultans to rob and enslave the fugitive Bashkirs. In the "Extract on the Bashkirs", compiled by the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, it was noted that the Kazakhs of the Younger Zhuz "for the most part plundered the fugitive Bashkirs and their wives from their husbands, and separated the children from their fathers and mothers and thus made them captives, and between the Kirghis-Kaisaks themselves of one kind with another, fights and murders took place for them ... ”[Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 36. Op. 1. D. 439. L. 246]. The scale of the robbery can be judged, if only because on one day Nuraly handed over to Tekelev about 6 thousand slaves from the former captive Bashkirs [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 36. Op. 1. D. 439. L. 247v.]. In 1771, the Kazakhs were allowed to do the same in relation to the Volga Kalmyks who rebelled against Russia [Archive of St. Once. II. Op. 7. D. 3, 4]. In addition, in addition to other rewards for the performance of official duties (in this case, for the performance of police functions), in the winter of 1755, Kazakhs were allowed to cross to the right side of the Urals for winter roaming. This, on the one hand, increased the authority of the Abulkhairids. On the other hand, this was considered by the government as additional funding for the post of khan, since the government and local authorities did not resist the fact that Nuraly and his relatives introduced a regular one percent tax on the Kazakhs for driving cattle across the Urals [AVPRI Russian Foreign Ministry. F. 122. 1775-1786 L. 2. L. 189]. In order to limit the growth of Nuraly's popularity, various methods were used, including support for the anti-Kazakh speeches of other non-Russian groups of the empire [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 36. Op. 1. D. 439. L. 12v. - 15 about. etc.], and a ban on wandering in the Volga-Ural interfluve [Bykov A.Yu., 2003, p. 34-35].
The growing dependence of Nuraly on the Russian administration and his performance of administrative functions as the sender of the post of khan led to a weakening of his position in the traditional hierarchy and a fall in his authority, i.e. led to a certain limitation of his powers as a khan by rank, and to a large extent to the devaluation of the rank itself. Customary legal and institutional statuses and roles began to conflict in this case, which intensified over time. An example of the Khan's reaction to a change in the situation is his attempt to get the Russian authorities to approve his son Ishim (Yesim) as the heir. Modern jurists note that Kazakh customary law did not know inheritance by will and discretion of the heir [History of the state and law of the Kazakh SSR. Part 1, p. 73]. As rightly noted by A.I. Levshin, “this desire was new, but did not contradict the types of Russia” [Levshin A.I., p. 245]. In an effort to prevent any possibility of manifestation of separatism on the part of the khans, in the 1780s. O.A. Igelstrom proposed to simultaneously introduce the positions of three khans in the Younger Zhuz, proposing the descendants of Kaip as a candidate, establishing the rule of each in one of the tribal associations (alimuly, bayuly and zhetyru), and a little later came to the conclusion that it was necessary to completely abolish this position [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAN. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 22. L. 16-19, 45-50]. In 1785, Catherine II approved a proposal to eliminate the khan's power (positions of the Russian administrative and political hierarchy) in the Younger Zhuz with the wish that the Kazakhs become "accustomed to the direct leadership of our main military commanders there" [AVPRI MFA RF. F. 122. Op. 122/3. 1785 D. 2. L. 2v. – 3]. Khan Nuraly was invited to the line for a conversation, where he was detained and placed under house arrest in Ufa, where he died. As a formal explanation to the Kazakhs of such an act, the Russian authorities put forward the idea of protecting the interests of Sharua. In the report of O.A. Igelstrom to Catherine II, it was noted that “Nurali Khan, for the first 8 years of his reign, followed his father’s example, but already 30 years ago, separating from himself all the best elders, with whom he henceforth had agreement and advice, he does not care in the least about the welfare of the people, but still to the pleasure of his greed, he fixes various oppressions on it” [AVPRI MFA RF. F. 122. Op. 122/1. 1775-1786 D. 2]. Similar requests of the “common people” became the reason for the Russian authorities to restrict the powers of Vali Khan in the Middle Zhuz [Levshin A.I., p. 282] and the approval of Sultan Bukei (son of Sultan Barak), who ruled in parallel with the descendant of Ablai, in the khan's dignity.
On the initiative of O.A. Igelstrom, a khan's council was established, later - tribal reprisals and a number of other bodies, the leadership of which was also associated with the performance of certain tasks, the implementation of decisions of higher bodies of the provincial administration. The persons accepted for the post were representatives of the traditional Kara-Suyek nobility.
We agree with the opinion of A.B. Kamensky, in the Russian Empire of the XVIII century. “The rationalization of management on bureaucratic principles came into conflict with the desire of the state to reproduce and preserve the estate structure of the Western European type. Another trend aimed at optimizing and rationalizing management mechanisms based on the principles of cameralism led to the formation of an extensive bureaucratic apparatus” [Kamensky A.B., p. 5].
In the changed historical context at the turn of the 18th-19th centuries, the imposition of lexical concepts played a somewhat different role. Under the conditions of the beginning of the Great French Revolution, any encroachment on the existing foundations, and even more so on the power of the nobility and the monarchy, was severely suppressed. Attempts by O.A. Igelstrom to reform the management system of the Kazakhs, bringing it as close as possible to the provisions of the Institutions for the management of the provinces in 1775 [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 106. L. 11; Archive of SPb II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 73. L. 10 and others], in particular, the abolition of the supreme power of the khans, were interpreted by his opponents as an encroachment on the autocratic foundations. “It is characteristic that adjutant O.A. Igelstrom, Colonel Grankin, in a denunciation of his boss dated December 13, 1788, accused the governor-general of not noble, simple Kazakhs being chosen for the birth massacres” [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 106. L. 31]. Igelstrom was removed, the khan's power of the heirs of Abulkhair was restored. However, this did not lead to social stabilization. On the contrary, the reign of Yeraly and Ishim was associated with the intensification of the performances of the Kazakhs under the leadership of the batyr Srym Datov.
The government actually reversed its decision, returning Baron Igelstrom to his post. However, the khan's rule was restored, limited by new administrative bodies - the Khan's Council, the Border Courts and the Border Commission [Vyatkin MP, 1957]. The inconsistency of the Russian course on the issue of the need / inexpediency of maintaining the khan’s power led to an intensification of the split between the nobility of Kara- and Ak-Suyek: him Erali. Soon Ishim, and after the death of his current Aichuvak, and how the power was taken away from the beys, the people of Kirghiz, having become corrupt, not knowing whom to respect or whom to obey, were divided from each other ”[Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 179. Op. 1. D. 11. L. 3 rev. - four].
An interesting outline of the events of this time in the description of Major General Gens. In 1797, after the assassination of Khan Ishim by Srym, the question of a candidate for this post again arose. The choice of the Orenburg authorities fell on the son of Nuraly, Sultan Bukei. However, “Sultan Karatay, as his elder brother, considering himself offended, believing that he should be a khan, although Bukei was chosen by the people, who did not want to have a khan due to his (Karatai’s) hot temper. Karatay lured Bukei to his village and did not let him out until Baron Igelstrom decided to make the decrepit Aichuvak Khan, to which Karatay agreed, respecting his old age and hoping that he would die soon” [RGIA. F. 853. Op. 1. D. 236. 1844. L. 2].
In 1801, returning to Igelstrom's idea of creating several administrative units - khanates from the Kazakhs of the Little Zhuz, the Bukeev Horde was created, the khan of which in 1812 was approved by Sultan Bukei.
In Kazakh society, the title of Khan was for life. It was not accepted to give up the khanate. The existing evidence of 1762 by the translator F. Gordeev that “Khan Abulmambet, fearing an attack by the Chinese Empire, does not want to be a khan in Turkestan” [AVPRI MFA RF. F. 122. D. 14. L. 27 v.], in relation to the renunciation does not seem reliable. In this and similar cases, the information from the sources testifies only to the migration of the owner.
In 1805, Aichuvak, “due to his old age, was dismissed from the khanate, and his son Dzhantyurya Sultan was erected in his place” [RGIA. F. 853. Op. 1. D. 236. 1844 L. 3v. - four]. There is a version that the resignation (!) from the khanate, filed by Aichuvak, was falsified by Zhan-tore, who aspired to become a khan by any means. The official version of the dismissal of Aishuak in a letter to Chancellor A.R. Vorontsov dated September 15, 1805 was outlined by the Orenburg military governor G.S. Volkonsky, noting that the khan “due to the weakness of his health ... asked me to intercede at the throne of the monarch in the discussion of his dismissal from the khan's office; and the Sovereign Emperor, on May 26 of this year, on May 26 of this year, on this dismissal, most mercifully grant him a pension of 1,000 rubles a year after his death; and he deigned to elect a new khan in his place, deigning to appoint this dignity mainly to Sultan Dzhantyuru, the son of Aichuvak khan. The election was held according to the traditional rite "by the voluntary consent of all the ancestors and the people" with subsequent confirmation [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 22. L. 52-53]. Representatives of the Russian authorities gave a different interpretation a few years later: “The appointment of Dzhantyuri was made secretly, and only the baigushi (poor people - A.B.) who roamed near Orenburg declared their desire to have a khan by attaching their seals” [RGIA. F. 853. Op. 1. D. 236. 1844. L. 4].
Karatay did not recognize the power of the new khan and began to actively intrigue against him, as well as rob caravans passing through the steppe. Moreover, he achieved his own election as a khan by a part of the Kazakh elders, but was not recognized by the Russian government. The Orenburg military governor, Prince Volkonsky, considered, however, the possibility of making Karatay Khan of the Turkmens, but “he replied that he considered it indecent to leave his people and go to someone else. In 1809, Jantyurya was killed, probably on the orders of Karatay” [RGIA. F. 853. Op. 1. D. 236. 1844. L. 4 rev.]. Aishuak died in 1810. Karatay believed that now he would achieve confirmation, and temporarily stopped his armed actions, but he failed to achieve full disposition and trust from the Orenburg authorities, as a result, in 1812, Bukei and Shirgazy Aishuakov were proclaimed khans. Both were convenient, because "one will live in Russia, and the other is unable to govern the people" [RGIA. F. 853. Op. 1. D. 236. 1844. L. 5]. However, Shirgazy Aichuvakov managed to achieve the location of the ataman of the Ural army D. Donskov. The joint “military search” for supporters of the khan and the Cossacks of real, and more often imaginary state criminals in the steppe led to massive robberies of the Kazakh sharua and their dissatisfaction, both with the appointed khan and with the Russian authorities as a whole [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 22. L. 159-160]. This stimulated the growth in popularity of khans who were not approved by the Russian government.
In 1815, another contender for the title of khan appeared - Sultan Aryngazy Abulgaziev, Zhadigid, the grandson of the Khiva Khan Kaip and Sultan Batyr. In 1816, the Kazakhs of the Alimuly generation recognized him as Khan. The main pillar of his power was the strong and numerous clans of Chikly, Shumekey and Jagalbayly [RGIA. F. 1291. Op. 8. D. 44 b. 1811 L. 21-22]. This generation fought against the Khanate of Khiva, whose rulers tried to install Menenbai and Shirgazy Kaipov as khans among them. As already noted, under the conditions of a foreign political threat, the powers of the khan in the traditional society of Kazakh nomads increased sharply. In particular, Aryngazy received the right to apply the death penalty, introduced Sharia justice, strengthened the veneration of rank, introduced regular taxation, etc., bringing his own powers as close as possible to those of the royal ones.
Thus, in the second half of the second decade of the XIX century. in the Junior Zhuz there were two khans by rank - Karatai and Aryngazy, and two khans by position, respectively Bukei and Shirgazy Aichuvaks - from Russia, and Dzhingazy-Menenbai and Shirgazy Kaipov - from Khiva. It should be noted that Karatay and Aryngazy, albeit from different motives, both sought to institutionalize their position in the form of confirmation by the Russian government in rank. By the way, historians who do not take into account the peculiarities of that moment happen to confuse Shirgazy Aichuvakov and Shirgazy Kaipov.
Orenburg Governor-General P.K. Essen had to decide which side to support. On the one hand, he was obliged to preserve Russian political institutions, on the other hand, the struggle in the Younger Zhuz led to a sharp drop in trade turnover on the Orenburg market. According to customs reports, “the Kyrgyz exchange had already ceased altogether and the reason for this was strongly believed to be the attack and bloodshed perpetrated by the Khan on the Kyrgyz near Orenburg” [RGIA. F. 1291. Op. 8. D. 44 b. 1811 L. 184v.]. At the same time, the trade of the Siberian border towns with the Kazakhs of the Middle Zhuz intensified [Bykov A.Yu., 2003, p. 59-66]. Gradually, the general's sympathies began to lean towards Aryngazy.
On August 29, 1817, another appeal was received from the sultans and foremen of the Junior and Middle Zhuzs with a request to replace the khan. In particular, it said: “At one time, by the highest command, Sultan Shirgazy Aychuvakov was elected to the khans. Now, however, we see that there is no benefit from this ruler, for he makes indulgence to public thieves and allowed the Horde to be completely upset” [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 23. L. 159]. As an alternative candidate, the Kazakh foremen also proposed Aryngazy. There was also a danger that Aryngazy and the Kazakhs subordinate to him would become Khiva subjects. All this predetermined the final choice of P.K. Essen, who, in a secret report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated November 3, 1818, proposed to approve Sultan Aryngazy as the Khan of the Kazakhs of the Younger Trans-Ural Horde, Sultan Aryngazy, and to dismiss Khan Shirgazy Aychuvakov “from managing the Lesser Horde, assigning him and his family his stay in Ufa or Menzelinsk with a pension of 2000 rubles each for a year” [RGIA. F. 1291. Op. 8. D. 44 a. L. 3]. To raise the official status to confirmation, Aryngazy was proposed to be awarded with a golden saber on a blue ribbon with diamond decorations, “since there are ordinary foremen in the horde who have medals on blue ribbons” [RGIA. F. 1291. Op. 8. D. 44 a. L. 2v.]. In addition, it was proposed to stop quarrels with Karatay Nuraliev, who "took the intention to unite with ... Arungazi" [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 22. L. 135].
The governor's support for Aryngazy was expressed not only in external respect, but also in the fact that he was allowed to use the Russian troops who accompanied the mission of A.F. Negri to Bukhara, against the Khivans [VPR. Ser. 2. T. 3(11), 4(12)]. Essen managed to convince K.V. Nesselrode, who came with such a proposal to Emperor Alexander I. Despite all the persuasiveness of the arguments, for ethical reasons the emperor did not support the idea of deposing Shirgazy, noting in the margins of Nesselrode’s note that “the divinatory benefit promised from the removal of Khan Shirgazy cannot be compared with those positive benefits that should be expected from keeping in holiness the promise given by the highest imperial name to Khan Abulkhair, to keep the khan's dignity in his offspring ... ”[Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 22. L. 189].
The Orenburg Governor-General continued to insist on his own way out of the crisis in the Younger Zhuz. To clarify the situation on the spot, the government sent State Councilor Timkovsky (not to be confused with the head of the Trinity Customs) to the steppe. The inspector fell under the influence of the charm of Shirgazy Aichuvakov. Comparing the personal qualities of Khan Shirgazy and Sultan Aryngazy, Timkovsky denounced: “The quiet, slow and unenterprising spirit and great piety of the former, behavior unstained by any crime, remove from him any suspicion of any intention” [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 23. L. 209]. The auditor was mistaken, and Shirgazy at that time, as Essen reported, was conducting secret negotiations with Khiva [RGIA. F. 853. Op. 1. D. 236. L. 7 rev.].
V.F. Timkovsky accepted the point of Shirgazy. The letter of the latter with explanations of the events that had taken place was delivered to the emperor. It gave such an interpretation of the events that it followed that the Governor-General P.K. Essen and the president of the Orenburg Border Commission, Major General Veselitsky, who completely took the side of the "robber" Aryngazy and first introduced him to the Khan's Council, and then completely appointed him chairman of this authorized body "without any advice or consent from me ..." [Archive SPb II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 23. L. 197]. He also complained about the threats of removal from the khan's dignity, emanating from the highest Orenburg authorities, mentioning, among other things, that the claims of the authorities were reduced to the Khan's dishonest performance of his duties. Parrying such claims, the khan justified himself by the inconsistency of bureaucratic forms of government with nomadic life: “I can’t solve cases, since my people are nomadic, orders take a long time” [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 23. L. 199].
The complication of relations with Khiva predetermined the choice of the government in favor of Shirgazy Aychuvakov. Aryngazy was summoned to St. Petersburg in 1820 allegedly for confirmation, detained, and later exiled to Kaluga, where he died in 1833 [RGIA. F. 853. Op. 1. D. 236. 1844. L. 7 rev. - eight]. Even after the exile, Essen continued to insist on the return of Aryngazy and on raising him to the dignity of a khan. When this turned out to be unacceptable, he proposed to the government in his draft Charter on the Orenburg Kirghiz of 1822 to abolish the institution (position) of khan power in the Lesser Transural Horde altogether. The project was not accepted. It went through a long discussion, and only in January 1824, after revisions, a document was adopted called “The approved opinion of the Committee of Asian Affairs regarding the transformation of the administration of the Orenburg Territory” [MIIPS, p. 205-210].
The textual analysis of the document showed that it was not about the abolition of the institution of khan power in the traditional sense, i.e. not about the elimination of the title and title of khan, but specifically about the elimination of the post of khan, provided for by the Russian imperial hierarchy [Bykov A.Yu., 2000, p. 371-375]. The documents at our disposal now convincingly prove the B.M. Abdrakhmanova and us the hypothesis about the illegality of the established dating of the abolition of the institute of khan power in the Junior Kazakh zhuz in 1822 [Abdrakhmanova B.M.]. The reason is the same here - the researchers confused the title of khan with the homonym position. Khan, indeed, was invited to Orenburg and made Honorary First Present of the Orenburg Border Commission. He was given a new salary of 600 rubles. However, there was no talk of removing the khan's title from him in the documents. On the contrary, in correspondence, appeals during personal meetings, etc. Shirgazy Aichuvakov continued to be called Khan. It was specially emphasized that “for greater convenience [of exercising powers] in these relations, establish for the khan his permanent residence in Orenburg, with the title of First Present in the Border Commission ... By these means and respectful treatment, all external honors are preserved for the khan, and in essence the main influence on the Horde will have The Orenburg authorities through the senior sultans” [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 23. L. 425]. Moreover, for some time the issue of restoring the khan's position continued to be considered, provided that the Trans-Ural and Bukeev hordes were divided into two parts. In a letter to K.V. Nesselrode P.K. Essen noted that it was necessary to strengthen the executive power in the steppe. “To achieve this, it is necessary that each part of the Horde should be given a special khan and under his authority the Steppe Administration with a senior sultan in charge of police affairs ... to raise those of the aforementioned senior sultans to them” [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 23. L. 354].
Shirgazy did not want to put up with the status of a puppet khan in the rank of not charged with any powers. He demanded to build for himself a fortification in the steppe and to allocate a military unit "for action against the recalcitrant." Of interest is the argumentation of the Khan's desire to get out of the direct control of the Orenburg administration. In an appeal to K.V. Neselrode Khan noted that “I, being born in the Kirghiz-Kaisak steppe, continued my stay, roaming through the green young grass decorated with flowers and flowing rivers and channels. In a word, in free and pleasant air; I don’t like the air that exists in the real city of Orenburg, and I continue my living in it not willingly, but under compulsion” [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 23. L. 430]. Further in the letter, he asked to transfer the headquarters with the senior sultans subordinate to him to the steppe.
After receiving permission to leave, the khan did not return within the time period set by the Orenburg administration [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 23. L. 504]. Moreover, he sent his sons Idig and Mendiyar to the Khan of Khiva on a secret mission. According to the reports of the Russian authorities, from Khiva the purpose of this mission was the approval of Shirgazy as Khan [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 23. L. 490].
Moreover, in 1827, Khan Shirgazy tried to visit Khiva himself, but was detained by Kazakhs from the Chikla clan. The Russian authorities once again entered the government with a proposal to return Aryngazy, who had great authority in the Alimulin generation [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 23. L. 490]. Temir Eraliev, who was sent to this generation by the senior sultan, voluntarily resigned due to the impossibility of fulfilling orders due to sabotage by the Alimuly people [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 23. L. 435-436]. But once again, the provincial authorities were refused. True, now the government has made some concessions to the Orenburg authorities. As early as 1823, Essen suggested that Aryngazy be returned to the Younger Zhuz as the sultan-ruler of the Middle Part of the Horde [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 3]. The Asiatic Committee, by a decision of September 8, 1826, appointed his brother, Sultan Arda, to this position, explaining: “... Whose behavior and measures he takes to introduce a device and restore calm, will depend on the speedy dispatch of his Arungasia to the horde” [RGIA. F. 1291. Op. 8. 1823 D. 95. Part II. L. 100-101v.].
Having reached the limits of Khiva, Shirgazy was warmly received by the Khiva ruler and approved in the dignity of a khan. From Khiva, he begins to actively intrigue, agitating the Kazakhs to secession from the Russian Empire [RGIA. F. 1291. Op. 8. 1823 D. 126. 1827 L. 3-4 rev.; Archive of SPb II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 22. L. 492, 529-531]. And at the same time, he continued to be called the Khan of the Kazakhs by the Russian administration until October 7, 1833 [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 22. L. 504].
It should be noted that the imposition of concepts also had the opposite effect, when individual Kazakhs, striving to receive the title of khan, sought approval in the post. Thus, the above-mentioned Sultan Karatay Nuraliev fought for several years for recognition as a khan. “... When the Russian government, during the abolition of the khan’s power in the Lesser Horde in 1823, appointed him as the sultan the ruler of the Western part, it found in Karatay a zealous and loyal agent in its colonial policy” [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 106. L. 66]. As archival materials show, one of the main merits of Karatai, according to the Orenburg authorities, was that he was the first to attract Kazakhs to the regular performance of police functions by Kazakhs [RGIA. F. 853. Op. 1. D. 236. L. 19]. From the second quarter of the 19th century Kazakhs often began to consider the position (no longer khan's) as a title (actually khan's!). The following example is even more indicative in this respect. December 5, 1833 Orenburg Governor-General V.A. Perovsky wrote to the director of the Asian Department, K.K. Rodofinikin about the proclamation of himself by Sultan Kusyak-Ali as Sultan-ruler of the Western part of the Younger Horde, i.e. he began to consider this position as an analogue to the rank of khan (!) [Archive of the St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 115-116]. The same situation was typical for the Middle Zhuz. The materials of the First Siberian Committee demonstrate that after the abolition of the khan's power here according to the Charter on the Siberian Kirghiz of 1822, the sultans sought to secure for themselves in hereditary form the title (namely the title!) of the senior sultan. The Russian authorities could not go for the devaluation of the official concept, but in return for the loss of the khan's title, at the suggestion of the West Siberian Governor-General Gorchakov, the direct descendants of the khans Ablai and Bukei were granted princely dignity (title, rank) [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 18]. Proposed in 1830 by General Velyaminov, a draft of a new Statute on the Siberian Kirghiz, which included provisions on the hereditary power of senior sultans and the election of officials exclusively from among the Genghisides, was rejected by the First Siberian Committee [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 43-49]. In the Younger Zhuz, the first precedent for raising to the princely dignity was the granting of this title to the widow of Khan Abulkhair Khanshe Popai.
In another part of the Younger Zhuz - the Inner or Bukey Horde (Khanate), the process of devaluing the khan's title and turning it into a position that was abolished was in many respects similar to the processes in the Trans-Ural Horde. After the death in 1815 of Sultan Bukei, who left a will approved by the council of sultans and elders [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 106. L. 57] (which was uncharacteristic for the customary legal practice of the Kazakhs) in the name of his minor son Sultan Dzhangir, the brother of Bukei, Sultan Shigay, began to rule the khanate, striving to keep this position for himself. To do this, he “in February 1822 ... reported to the Orenburg military governor that this latter (Dzhangir - A.B.) was spreading rumors in the Horde that he, having a paper from his superiors for the rank of khan, was forcing the Kyrgyz ancestors to apply their seals to the paper of this and through this causes disorder in the Horde, which, according to the information collected later, turned out to be false ”[RGIA. F. 853. Op. 1. D. 236. 1844. L. 8]. It is significant that Sultan Dzhangir also appealed not to traditional institutions, but to the Russian authorities, justifying himself before the Russian authorities and accusing his uncle of treachery [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 23. L. 371]. The final decision on the new ruler was made by the Saratov and Astrakhan governors-general, who both spoke in favor of the young, Russian-educated Dzhangir, who “by his qualities won respect and power of attorney not only among the Kyrgyz, but also from Russian residents” [RGIA. F. 1291. Op. 8. D. 5. 1801. L. 105v.].
Kaip-Gali Ishimov also claimed the khan's dignity. In 1828, he organized the migration of part of the Kazakhs of the Bukeev Khanate to the Trans-Ural steppe. After some time, he was captured and, giving explanations, he emphasized that he was “ready, according to the oath taken, to serve H.I.V. as it should be according to the laws” [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 3]. The Russian authorities did not approve Kaip-Gali in the rank of khan, but the Khiva khan Allakul did it in 1836 [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 146-147]. But already in 1841, the newly-minted Khan refused this title and fussed with the Orenburg military governor V.A. Perovsky about the amnesty [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 172-173].
Even after the death of Khan Dzhangir in 1845, the khan's power in the Inner Horde was not abolished. Despite the fact that the horde itself was transferred to the departmental subordination of the Ministry of State Property, the Kazakhs of the Inner Horde did not pay taxes to the Russian government for some time [Blaramberg I.F., p. 215]. Khan until his death was the son of Jangir - Sahib Giray. He was granted a princely title. Emperor Nicholas I "expressed a preliminary consent to the approval of the eldest son of Khan Dzhanger, Sahib-Girey, the heir to the khan's dignity after his course in the Corps of Pages" in St. Petersburg. Just before the graduation from the page corps, the Minister of State Property, Count Kiselev, came up with the initiative to abolish the khan's office. Sahib-Girey was seconded to the Orenburg military Obruchev with the condition that, upon reaching adulthood, he would lead the Horde, but not as a khan, but as a ruler. In 1849 Sahib Giray died suddenly. Plans to preserve the possibility of the post of khan existed until 1852, when the page corps graduated from the youngest son of Dzhangir - Ibrahim, who was also granted the princely title, but he and his relatives were removed from the management of the Horde, but Ibrahim's descendants received hereditary princely dignity, becoming one of the the highest tribal elite of the Russian Empire.
1849 became the chronological boundary of the actual abolition of the post of khan in the Russian administrative and political hierarchy in the Kazakh steppe. Proposals to restore this institution sometimes came later, but were rejected by the government. The last of the proposals of this kind known to us was submitted for discussion in the post-reform era, or rather on January 31, 1863, and was called "Consideration on the transformation of management among the lineage of the Orenburg department of the Kirghiz." Based on the results of the discussion, a peremptory conclusion was made: “the khans and the people in the steppe not only do not constitute an organic whole, but have completely different, even opposite interests, and that the existence of the khans is positively harmful, both for the Kyrgyz people themselves and regarding Russia’s views on this people » [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 28. L. 76]. Before the reform of 1868, such a body as the Khan's Council was formally preserved in the Inner Horde, but it acted as a county body "as a purely judicial and administrative board" [RGIA. F. 853. Op. 1. 1857. D. 58. L. 2]. After this date, the Khan's Council was renamed the Provisional Council for the Management of the Inner Kirghiz Horde, which existed with this name until the collapse of the Russian Empire.
According to the same scheme, but with significant differences in details, the question of the abolition of the khan's power in the Middle Zhuz was resolved. Its analysis is of interest, including in terms of a possible comparative study, but is not the subject of this article. We confine ourselves to the remark that, perhaps, the first attempt to transform a rank into a position here was the proposal of the Russian authorities in 1759-1760. Ablai in his confirmation [Suleimenov R.B., Moiseev V.A., p. 93-94] during the lifetime of Abulmambet, acting, but having lost his actual power. However, Ablai refused and was approved in the rank of khan only in 1780, nine years after he was raised on a white felt mat. However, the Russian authorities did not stop trying to turn the rank into a position, the condition for which was to increase the personal dependence of the khans on the government and the Siberian provincial authorities. Just like the rulers of the Little Zhuz, the Kazakh sultans and khans of the Middle Zhuz were paid salaries by the government. According to the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers of June 7, 1739, Khan Abulmambet, as well as the sultans Barak and Ablai [RIO. T. 126, p. 515, 547-548]. The proclamation of Ablai's heir, Sultan Vali Khan, in 1781, which took place independently of the imperial administration, was recognized as erroneous [VPR. Ser. 2. T. 4(12), p. 282]. Moreover, in his letter to Empress Catherine II, he undertook obligations to “exterminate thieves” among the Kazakhs [KRO-2, p. 108]. Although in order to him, according to information transmitted by I. Shangin from the words of Sultan Khuday-Menda, the sultans, foremen and mullahs demanded that “the khan during his reign should follow exactly the rites and customs of his ancestors” [TsHAF AK. F. 1. Op. 2 additional D. 85. L. 158v.].
In parallel with Khan Vali, in 1812, Sultan Bukei, a descendant of Sultan Barak, was approved as Khan among part of the Kazakhs of the Middle Zhuz (the Naiman generation and a number of other clans). They became the last khans of the Middle Zhuz (Middle Horde) officially recognized by the Russian administration. Moreover, they were already approved not so much in rank as in position. The fact that they did not have real power can be judged by the repeated appeals of the Kazakhs to the Russian administration with a request to save them from the unpopular khans [Kuzembay-uly A., Abilev E., p. 195-196]. Later, the government acknowledged the fact of imposing a candidate on the Kazakhs. In one of the documents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (1868) one can read: “Establishing the khans in a certain family, we also went against the inherent Kyrgyz (Kazakh - A.B.) principle of freedom of choice and their fundamental beliefs in the dignity of the generic meaning and personal qualities” [TsGA RK. F. 64. Op. 1. D. 151. L. 101v.].
With the death of Bukei and Vali in 1817 and 1819. accordingly, the post of Khan of the Middle Horde was abolished. The Charter of 1822 did not provide for the post of khan. For some time, the Russian authorities still considered the possibility of appointing Gabaydulla, the younger brother of Khan Vali, as khan, but abandoned their intention, citing the unpopularity of the sultan and the fact that the traditional rite of choosing a khan by the Kazakhs “at a commemoration, among ordinary steppe feasts, may seem to be another distant not quite solid” [VPR. Ser. 2. T. 4(12), p. 282–283]. With regard to Gabaydulla, the Siberian authorities proposed to act similarly to what they had done with respect to Karatay in the Younger Zhuz, appointing him as the sultan-ruler. The Russian authorities hoped that Gabaydulla was content with the rank of colonel and the post of senior sultan of the Kokchetav outer district. The corresponding decree was given to A. Grigorovsky, who was preparing the opening of the district [Abuev K.K., p. 4-5], however, the descendant of Khan Ablai turned to the Qing government with a request to recognize him as the Khan of the Kazakhs, and the Russian authorities wrote a letter notifying them of his death [Strelkova I., p. 15-16]. Gabaidulla was approved by the Chinese court in the dignity of a khan, but when he tried to meet with Chinese envoys, he was arrested by the Russian authorities [Moiseev V.A., 1991, p. 48-51; Erofeeva I.V., 1997, p. 92-93, 135-136]. Later he was sent into exile in Berezov, where he lived until 1848, when he was given an amnesty in connection with the end of the movement of his relative Kenesary Kasymov and the official renunciation of the rank of khan [Abuev K.K., Bekseitova A.T., b. 57-58]. A number of high-ranking Russian officials tried to woo khans and other sultans. So, the Orenburg military governor V.A. Perovsky considered it expedient to recognize Sultan Kenesary as Khan. However, the government approved the opinion of the West Siberian Governor-General Gorchakov, who considered such a measure harmful to the interests of the government [Bekmakhanov E.B., p. 244-249]. One of the high-ranking officials who supported the initiatives of the Orenburg authorities was the head of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs K.K. Rodofinikin proposed, in contrast to Kenesary, to recognize as a khan one of the two senior sultans of the outer districts of the Omsk region - T. Chingisov or A. Gabbasov, but his initiatives were also rejected by Emperor Nicholas I [Tilegenova L.T., b. 73-74].
Thus, attempts to achieve recognition as khans, undertaken by the descendants of Ablai, did not lead to the desired result. The last khan raised on a white felt mat in Turkestan according to the traditional rite was Kenesary Kasymov, who achieved such an honor in 1841. After his death in 1847, attempts to proclaim one of the sultans as a khan were no longer made. With regard to the elimination of the nominal khan's power, as we see, there was an almost complete synchronism in the flow of processes in the Junior and Middle Kazakh zhuzes. Their coordination undoubtedly reflects the position of the St. Petersburg cabinet and the emperor.
The last attempt to proclaim a khan without confirmation was the election of Abdulgafar, one of the leaders of the Turgai Kazakh uprising in 1916, as a khan. degradation of perception of ak-suyek by sharua.
So, the inclusion of the Kazakhs of the Younger and Middle Zhuzes into the Russian Empire required the combination of traditional potestary and new state institutions. For a long time they coexisted, complementing each other and performing various functions. However, gradually, for various reasons, but to a large extent due to the performance of these roles by the same persons, these structural elements of the socio-political organization began to overlap each other. The result of this overlap was confusion, reflected in the incorrect assessment of certain events, both by contemporaries and descendants. In this article, for example, the dating of the abolition of the khan's power in the Trans-Ural Horde was clarified. The date of abolition cannot be considered the approval of the Opinion of the Asian Committee, as a significant part of the researchers and even some of the contemporaries believed. The official recognition of the existence of the institute of khan power in the traditional sense (potestar structure) continued for another 9 years, until 1833. Moreover, it was Shirgazy Aichuvakov who was mentioned in the rank of khan, dismissed in 1824 from the khan's position, in connection with the abolition of such and redistribution functions between members of the Orenburg Border Commission and the institution of sultans-rulers (senior sultans).
For various reasons, the authority of traditional management structures was gradually undermined and replaced by institutional ones. In this case, the imposition of lexical concepts not only introduced confusion, but also facilitated the process of expanding the scope of state bodies, acting as a kind of psychological shock absorber for possible negative social consequences caused by the processes of political modernization. The parallel existence of potestary and state institutions of the same name became impossible in the middle of the 19th century, when the Russian government made the final decision to eliminate these positions and transfer their powers to other administrative bodies. Surprisingly, at the same time, this contributed to the decline of traditional institutions, the senders of which sought to incorporate themselves into new bodies, believing in this way to retain their former status. Together, this contributed to the decline of the potestary system, the loss of a number of its integral functions and the inclusion of many customary legal institutions in the judicial-legal and executive imperial system, as well as the bureaucracy of traditional titles and their transformation into official positions. In the end, this paved the way for the unification of the system of government within a single imperial space by abolishing atypical positions and titles. At the same time, one cannot speak of the complete completion of this process in the period before the collapse of the Russian Empire (February 1917). Traditional institutions continued to function actively at the lower taxonomic levels of social organization, forming a conglomerate with official institutions.
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It is natural that the problem of assessing the level of organization of power in nomadic societies is one of the debatable in modern political anthropology and oriental studies. On it, researchers express different points of view. A number of authors advocate the idea of a fairly high level of development of social relations among nomads and the resulting high degree of property differentiation and social polarization. This group of scientists concludes that the pastoral peoples have such a system of organizing power-subjugation relations, which should be characterized as a state system. In particular, the Kazakh khanates of the XV-XVIII centuries. are often considered as states of a feudal or semi-feudal (patriarchal-feudal) type [Vladimirtsov B.Ya., Materials of the United ... and others]. To a large extent, the dominance of such a position was influenced by the formational approach. The lexicon of established definitions reflected in the sources and previous studies, as well as the use in colloquial speech of such concepts as "empire", "state", "khanate", "ruler", "ruler" pushed the researchers to such a solution to the issue. They have analogies and direct lexical coincidences of definitions in the thesaurus of scientists, which describe societies with a pronounced institutional structure of power and nomadic socio-political formations, and their meanings are often superimposed or identified.
Other researchers, on the contrary, come to almost complete denial of the existence of significant economic and, as a result, social differentiation in the society of nomads. Researchers who adhere to this position note qualitative differences in attitudes towards property, power, and other categories in settled agricultural and nomadic communities. It is emphasized that socio-economic, and after them political changes in the nomadic culture occurred only under the influence of urban civilization. Nomadism had no prospects for socio-economic progress, being a dead end branch of the development of world civilization [Markov G.E.; Kalinovskaya K.P.].
The third group of authors also comes to the conclusion that there are no prospects for internal socio-economic growth and the development of nomadic societies. However, at the same time, the evolution of their political system is recorded, which changed in direct dependence and interconnection with neighboring political formations of settled agricultural societies. In particular, it was emphasized that statehood among nomads periodically arose and then disappeared again, which had no effect on the level of their socio-economic development, the development of economic specialization and the system of relations within society. The researchers noted that “politogenesis among nomads was a reversible, cyclical process. The periods of centralization and flourishing of the steppe empires gave way to the subsequent segmentation and death of the political formations of the nomads” [Kradin N.N., 1995, p. 196]. It was shown that exploitation in nomadic society was carried out in relation to foreigners, and in this case the entire society acted as a “class” of exploiters [Kradin N.N., 1990; Kradin N.N., 1992 and others].
An example of qualitatively different approaches to solving the issue of organizing power in a nomadic community is the assessment of the level of development of hierarchical structures among the Kazakhs on the eve and in the initial period of joining the Russian Empire. To a large extent, variations in assessments are determined by differences in research methodologies and paradigms, as well as by the authors' modern political predilections and their ethno-cultural identification. Without going into the details of the discussion on this issue, we only note that in this case, too, scientists defend the position of the need to assess both the state (institutional) and potestar levels of the organization of power in Kazakh society. To a large extent, the first approach was reflected in the publication of the second and third volumes of the new five-volume "History of Kazakhstan" [History of Kazakhstan ..., 1999; History of Kazakhstan ..., 2000] and a number of other publications, published mainly in Kazakhstan since the mid-1980s.
In our opinion, the arguments of researchers who do not consider the system of organization of power in the Kazakh society as a state system are more convincing. We agree with the point of view of V.A. Moiseev, who emphasizes that the Kazakh Khanate is a conditional name, the Kazakh society on the eve and in the initial period of joining Russia did not have its own statehood [Moiseev V.A., 1995, p. 22-26]. Numerous social groups of this society, whose functions included management, were poorly specialized and did not stand out from the main sphere of life - the nomadic pastoral economy. The main forms of social organization here were not the state and law, but the community and custom [Bykov A.Yu., 2003, p. 9-20]. It is significant that even in the second half of the XIX century. Orenburg military governor N.A. Kryzhanovsky noted that all the actions of the Kazakhs are committed “on the basis of either family ties or tribal enmity” [RGIA. F. 1291. Op. 8. D. 35. 1865. L. 1-1 rev.; Archive of SPb II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 83/1. L. 12].
Different approaches to assessing the level of socio-political development of the Kazakh society on the eve of the start of joining Russia were reflected in the qualitative assessment of both the very fact that the Kazakhs accepted Russian citizenship, and the typification and periodization of the further history of the Steppe Territory as part of the Russian Empire. So, I.V. Erofeeva believes that the first period of Kazakhstan's accession to Russia should be considered as the entry of Kazakh rulers into vassal dependence on the rulers of Russia, and she calls the stage itself "the era of the spread of the formal legal suzerainty of the Russian Empire to the Kazakh population of the Younger and Middle Zhuzes." Thus, relations between Russia and Kazakh zhuzes are viewed through the prism of relations between the rulers of feudal states. As a result, the fact of accession is estimated by the scientist as a fact of patronage typical of the international law of the Middle Ages [Erofeeva IV, 1999; Masanov N.E. et al., 2001]. The same approach is used by J.M. Tulibayeva, who gives similar assessments of the relations of the Kazakh rulers not only with Russia, but also with the Central Asian states. By analogy with the Central Asian possessions well known to the author, she interprets socio-political relations within the Kazakh society as “... a feudal fragmented state, consisting of several khanates. Within the khanates there were sultan's possessions, which, in turn, were divided into Biy's possessions” [Tulibaeva Zh.M., p. 76]. The opinion of Zh.M. Dzhampeisova, who believes that the presence of the Sultan's estate does not reflect the presence of feudal land holdings, but only characterizes the Kazakh society as socially stratified [Dzhampeisova Zh.M., p. fifteen]. The second period of I.V. Erofeeva calls "the era of the gradual establishment of the state-political protectorate of the Russian autocracy over the Kazakh zhuzes." This period, in her opinion, lies within the chronological framework of the middle of the 18th - early 19th centuries. [Masanov N.E. et al., 2001, p. 172-175]. However, here, too, the relationship took the form of a vassal-suzerain relationship. Undoubtedly, the synchronization of periodization by I.V. Erofeeva with the generally recognized periodization of the presence of the institute of khan power in Kazakhstan. Moreover, the very fact of its presence allows, in her opinion, to draw a conclusion about the existence of statehood among the Kazakhs in the above years. At the same time, this also allows us to conclude that the Russian policy towards the Kazakhs did not have colonial features. This point of view was expressed more clearly by K.A. Zhirenchin. He agrees with the assessment of relations between Russia and the Kazakhs as a relationship of vassalage. Moreover, he notes that it was the elimination of the institution of khan power, and with it the Kazakh statehood, that predetermined “for a historically long period, the political and legal status of Kazakhstan as a colony of the Russian Empire” [Zhirenchin K.A., p. 9]. The same author notes that a vassal form of dependence implies less independence than a protectorate [Zhirenchin K.A., p. 99-100].
In the works of other modern Kazakh researchers, one can find a slightly different assessment of the relationship between Russia and Kazakh rulers and the legal status of Kazakh lands and Kazakhs within the Russian Empire. In particular, A.K. Abilev and E.A. Abilev believe that relations between Russia and the Kazakhs subject to Abulkhair Khan "were built on the basis of a protectorate, a form of colonial dependence, when a dependent state retains sovereignty in all areas except foreign policy" [Kuzembaiuly A., Abil E., p. 27]. In this case, these two approaches are united by the fact that they both take into account the existence of statehood among the Kazakhs on the eve and at a certain stage of joining Russia. The difference between them is that the first approach does not consider the early stages of Kazakhstan's accession to Russia as a colonial expansion.
The third option for assessing the accession of Kazakhstan to Russia is an approach that does not take into account in this process the very fact of the presence or absence of khan power among the Kazakhs (it is simply an illustrative fact that does not have serious epistemological significance), as well as their desires and foreign policy preferences. In the last two decades, many works on Kazakh studies have been published, which interpret the accession of Kazakhstan to Russia as the conquest of the former by the former. One of the categorical innovations can be considered the introduction of such a concept as ethnocide, which is used in relation to the policy of Russia and the Soviet Union towards the Kazakhs. As a radical version of the implementation of the concept, one can cite the works of A. Seydimbek, in one of which the author states: “The Kazakh statehood in 1822 was forcibly liquidated, more precisely, destroyed. From that moment on, the most gifted sons and daughters of the Kazakh people stopped dying a natural death” [Seidimbek A., p. 554]. This approach is most fully reflected in the works of M.Zh. Abdirov [Abdirov M.Zh., 1994; Abdirov M.Zh., 2000 and others]. This approach finds methodological substantiation in the recently popular hypothesis about the formation of Russian imperialism in the era of Ivan IV's territorial acquisitions.
All three concepts are united by an assessment of the trend in the development of Russian-Kazakh relations towards the unification of the management of the Kazakh population within the Russian Empire with other social, political and ethnographic groups. And here, too, the fact of the liquidation of the institution of khan's power often turns out to be a milestone. The following explanation is quite typical: “Having eliminated the Kazakh khanates, removed the Kazakh sultans from control, the tsarist government thereby destroyed even the appearance of state independence of the Kazakhs and turned Kazakhstan into an ordinary province of the Russian Empire” [Tulibayeva Zh.M., p. 83].
In our opinion, the popularity of the topic and the conclusions of researchers are largely predetermined by the state ideology of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The President of independent Kazakhstan in one of his many works “In the Stream of History” concludes without sufficient argumentation that the Russian Empire liquidated the statehood of the Kazakhs, replacing them with tribal institutions that performed a disintegrating function. ON THE. Nazarbaev writes: “The system of alien national-state institutions did not develop the national unity of the Kazakhs, but, on the contrary, in every possible way used the institutions of tribal division as mechanisms for the disintegration of the nation” [Nazarbaev N.A., p. 47]. To substantiate the long history of the existence of statehood, sources were attracted and are attracted (or are fabricated), with references to the existence of the Kazakh Khanate. At the same time, the khan's title was, as it were, a marker of this statehood. According to the prevailing ideology, the longer the historical period of existence of the khan's power, the more prepared and objective was the appearance on the world map of a new independent state - the Republic of Kazakhstan. The search for a new identity stimulated the assertion of the concept of independent centuries-old statehood of the Kazakhs. In 1996, in Almaty, with the support of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, a major international scientific and practical conference "The Evolution of the Statehood of Kazakhstan" was held, timed to coincide with the 450th anniversary of the formation of the Kazakh state. With regard to the integration of the Kazakhs into the Russian Empire and the elimination of the institution of khan power, it was stated, in particular: “Since the construction of the first military fortifications (“military bases” in modern geopolitical language) and especially after the defeat of the movement of K. Kasymov (1847) we can talk about the end of the Kazakh state sovereignty, which lasted about 400 years, and the period of total colonization of Kazakhstan by Russia" [Khamzeeva B., Zainullina G., p. 360].
In our opinion, the issue discussed below about the essence of the khan's power and its constituent part - the elimination of the institution of khan's power in Kazakh society by the Russian colonial authorities should not be understood as an illustration of the characteristics of the forms of existence of the statehood of the Kazakhs and its elimination within the colonial system of the Russian Empire. On the contrary, the process of elimination of traditional institutions, their replacement by official bureaucratic structures, which took place in Kazakhstan under the influence of the Russian Empire, characterizes the formation and development of the colonial administration system. The result of this is the instillation of political culture and the development of institutional (statist) ideas among the Kazakhs. Moreover, it was the unification of the Kazakh patronymic units within the Russian Empire that limited particularism and zhuz separatism, which contributed to the national consolidation of the Kazakhs.
In the Kazakh society of this period, there were several social groups that exercised power. First of all, these included Genghisides (torah), or ak-suyek (white bone). They formed a special caste with obligatory endogamy for women. The estate formed by the tore was called the Sultan. The supreme rulers - khans - in the Kazakh society of the XVIII-XIX centuries. were elected by the traditional nobility only from among the sultans. The powers of the khan and sultans in different chronological periods ranged from expressing only formal external respect up to the application of the death penalty. The latter was more of an exception to customary legal practice than a regular and typical phenomenon. In general, the functions of khans and sultans were reduced mainly to the regulation of relations with external forces, both fellow tribesmen and foreigners. One of the documents noted that the sultans were elected “not at all for governance, but as solicitors for external relations” [RGIA. F. 1284. Op. 223. D. 85. 1886. L. 19 rev.].
The power of the Torah, as, indeed, of other groups, was based on custom and legitimized by adat. Personal authority and charisma were of great importance. Typical is the report of the Orenburg expedition of border affairs to Chancellor Count A.R. Vorontsov: “And when these foremen, khan’s children and other sultans, in the case of any popular demand, serve them at will, but they, the Kirghiz-kaisaka (Kazakhs - A.B.), love and revere them, but otherwise neglected” [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 106. L. 8]. Similar information was deposited in the documents of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs. In particular, the following report on the organization of governance in the Kazakh steppe is very characteristic: people do not acquire strength. Just as a khanate is obtained from them from soltans, for none of the simple ones are made into khans, by choice, for the most part, one that is more agile than others, so their strength among the people depends for the most part on their agility "[Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS . F. 36. Op. 1. D. 439. L. 5v.].
Kazakh society has not developed mechanisms for regulating social practice that are not related to customary law, custom or precedent. There was no bureaucracy, organically unacceptable due to the peculiarities of the economic structure, the high geographical mobility of the population and the lack of a sufficient share of the surplus product. The latter was due to the high degree of dependence of production on external conditions (jutes, epizootics, wars, barymta, etc.). This also predetermined the irregularity of fiscal collections and their unlimited size. P.I. Rychkov reported on this occasion: “Neither the khans nor the saltans receive income from certain people elected from the people; contains himself more from his own savings with voluntary gifts and booty in the war” [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 106. L. 11-12]. The conclusion of V.V. cannot be considered completely fair. Grigoriev that the Kazakhs “never and nowhere paid any tribute to their khans” [RGIA. F. 853. Op. 1. 1842-1851 D. 22. L. 42v.]. In our opinion, the conclusion of A.P. Chuloshnikov that fees and offerings in favor of the Kazakh khans (khanlyk) were in the nature of voluntary offerings [Chuloshnikov A.P., p. 216]. Despite the debatability of the issue, it seems that the rites of mutual assistance, mutual responsibility and other numerous institutions were not a vestige of obsolete social relations in Kazakh society. On the contrary, they played an important role in the organization and functioning of the system of social relations. The most indicative in this case is the attitude of nomadic Kazakhs to property, which was often perceived by the owners of this or that property as a temporary phenomenon. In addition, the clan, aul, family had significant property rights. Even in the middle of the XIX century. the Saratov merchant Zharkov, who visited the Kazakh steppe, reported that rich Kazakhs not only have debts, but also “kibitka money (kibitka tax is a form of Russian taxation of nomads - A.B.) pay for their poor people and correct their various needs” [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAN. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 83/1. L. 72].
Political activity in the Kazakh society did not stand out as an independent sphere of human activity. Even such a strong ruler as Khan Abulkhair was forced to engage in economic activities, and in order to solve foreign policy actions, he was forced to personally ride to the rulers and batyrs. So, J. Castle left evidence confirmed by other sources that in June 1736, when trying to organize a raid on the Ural border line, the khan of the Younger Zhuz “led on his horse to Dzhambek Batur (Dzhanibek-batyr - A.B.), which is about two days away" [Kastle J., p. 17].
During the growing real or virtual external danger, khans and sultans periodically made attempts to usurp power, but even they were not successful. Periods of foreign policy stabilization were accompanied by a weakening of the power of the khan and sultans. However, even with the tangible power of one or another Genghisides, tribal institutions limited it in every possible way. The following fact is interesting: in the XVIII century. khans Nuraly and Ablai were brought to the court of the biys, and both were obliged to pay kun (paying cattle for blood is the most common form of punishment for such crimes), as well as Sultan Barak, who was accused of killing Khan Abulkhair, but acquitted by the court of biys. Ivan Shangin reported that Khan Abulkhair was also sentenced to the trial of biys and the payment of a fine.
There were several groups of traditional nobility from among the black bone (kara-suyek). These included batyrs, tarkhans, foremen, bai and bii. The latter, resolving issues of customary legal proceedings, and often economic and social organization, were closest in their functions to the bureaucracy layer, but even they should not be classified in this way. They were associated with this practice not by law, but by custom, not by political institutions, but by tribal relations. Quite often, in sources of various origins, one can find explanations similar to the following: “The power of the biy is very relative and conditional. Biya is obeyed when his conviction coincides with the conviction of the crowd of his relatives; the bey's order means nothing if the elders in the families do not approve of them” [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 83/1. D. 26. L. 508-509]. In addition, there was always an overt or covert confrontation between the Kara- and Ak-Suyek nobility. This was shown in sufficient detail and convincingly at the end of the 19th century. A. Nikolsky [Archive of the St. Petersburg Branch of the Institute of Orthopedics RAS. Once. III. Op. 1. D. 48. L. 5 rev. – 37v.] and other authors. The confrontation weakened the positions of both those and other social groups with potestarno-political powers, strengthening communal, tribal and tribal institutions, primarily the role of the people's assembly or kurultai.
Thus, the Kazakh society on the eve and during the beginning of joining the Russian Empire was at the stage preceding the state, in other words, tribal. The institutions that regulated relations between members of the social collective were not legitimized by the social contract and written law. Accordingly, the so-called "owners" or "owners", often mentioned in the sources, were not analogues of state (bureaucratic) bodies, and the semantic coincidence of such concepts as "khan" and "sultan" with the concepts of other entities, for example, the Ottoman Empire or empire of Genghis Khan, did not mean the coincidence of their functions and powers. In our opinion, the Kazakh khans and sultans before the inclusion of their part in the system of Russian socio-political stratification are not positions, but titles. Even the highest dignitaries of Russia were misled by semantic coincidences. An anecdotal incident of that time is known. One of the courtiers tried to give an order to the Kazakh khan (under whom, according to reports, the sultans were, and the Kazakh ruler himself was under Russian citizenship) so that the khan would give an order to the Turkish sultan.
Since the formal inclusion of the Younger Kazakh zhuz in 1731 into the Russian Empire, the process of co-opting Kazakh rulers into the imperial political hierarchy began. Moreover, initially (and this is quite understandable) they were included with the same titles (here are the same names) that they had in the traditional structure of the Kazakh society: the khan remained the khan, the sultan - the sultan. However, the new role played by the Kazakh rulers in the face of Russia had a significant impact on the change in their status. There were no analogues of Kazakh institutions in the Russian political and genealogical structures; there simply were no such titles. The inclusion of part of the Kazakh nobility in the empire did not lead to a change in the hierarchy of ranks in the empire. On the contrary, the new role of the khan and a number of sultans turned out to be associated with the obligation to perform a number of functions that are characteristic of persons in the public service. The title of Khan gradually, at least from the point of view of the Russian authorities, began to be perceived precisely as a position. The Kazakhs still perceived this institution in the traditional sense.
Extremely indicative in this regard is the correspondence between the Russian authorities and Khan Abulkhair regarding the attacks of the Kazakhs of the Younger Zhuz on merchant caravans, as well as on Russian loyal subjects of the Bashkirs, Kalmyks and Ural Cossacks. The Russian authorities demanded an end to such actions, otherwise threatening Abulkhair with his removal, i.e. de facto dismissal. So, in the instructions of the Senate and the Collegium of Foreign Affairs for the foreman A.I. Tevkelev dated January 31, 1747, it was noted: if the khan fails to fulfill the indicated requirements, it is necessary “to set aside the evo (Abulkhair - A.B.) from the khanate, and instead of choosing the evo, make the khan from benevolent elders” [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 27. L. 13; AVPRI Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. F. 122. 1743. D. 3. L. 120v.]. Abulkhair, explaining to the Russian government his impotence and impossibility to stop such actions, wrote to the Empress: “... Our people are like wild animals ... and this Kirghiz-Kaisak people were disgusting to me” [KRO, p. 97]. That is, Abulkhair referred to his status as a khan in the potestary structure - to the title, and the Russian authorities focused on his functional duties.
By opposing the Kazakh sultans and khans to each other, the Russian government actually stimulated the latent phase of the conflict within the Kazakh society. By managing the conflict, the Russian authorities could control the general course of political processes without the large-scale use of military force, directing them in an acceptable direction for themselves. At the same time, the threat of separatism and armed uprisings against Russia came from the Kazakh rulers for a long time. Under such conditions, and also in connection with the gradual deeper integration of the outskirts into the general imperial infrastructure, the question of changing the management system in the Kazakh steppe and limiting internal self-government sounded more and more urgent. The first steps towards changing this situation were attempts to eliminate the institution of khan power in its traditional perception, i.e. as a title.
Gifts or rather bribes issued by the Russian authorities, taking on a regular character, became payment for the execution of orders, gradually turning into a salary. If at first the Russian authorities, fulfilling the requests of the Kazakh sultans, often passed the so-called "gifts" secretly, then gradually the nature of such offerings became fixed and carried out openly. More precisely, only a part of the amounts or goods in kind was transferred explicitly, the rest - secretly [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 36. Op. 1. D. 439. L. 32-32v. and etc.]. Here, by the way, the process of changing the perception of the custom by the Chingizids themselves, who sought to concentrate wealth in private property in this way, without showing its size of the corporation, can be traced. Orenburg chiefs - Governor-General I.I. Neplyuev and Major General A.I. Tevkelev wrote to the Collegium of Foreign Affairs in 1748: “When a salary is determined for the khan, then even if all the people wished to choose themselves without a decree of the khan, but that soltan, knowing that he would lose his e.i.v. the khanate will not accept mercy and salaries, and the foremen will not want their khan to be without a salary, for they have an ancient custom, as if he should share what he received with all the foremen” [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 63; AVPRI Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. F. 122. 1748. D. 3. L. 174 rev.]. Moreover, a number of difficult issues could be solved at that time only through regular payments. So, a quarrel with Khan Nuraly, caused by obscene abuse towards him of the Orenburg Governor-General Davydov, was stopped after they began to “give his brothers (Khan - A.B.) a salary in order to appease them” [Meyer L. , With. 14-15].
The Russian authorities realized that using the greed of certain circles of the Kazakh aristocracy was not a sufficient condition for maintaining their loyal obligations. In 1763, Catherine II wrote to the Orenburg vice-governor D.V. Volkov that “giving salaries to the Kyrgyz is not yet satisfied with the policy of arousing their love and inclination towards Russia” [IIB, p. 452], other measures are needed. The local Russian authorities understood the need to use traditional institutions to maintain relative stability and continuity in governance, but at the same time, the need for its gradual transformation, with a proposal about which they repeatedly went to the government. So, A.I. Tevkelev asked for permission from the government, so that the nomads “according to their current state, some rituals or orders should be reduced, and some should be added again” [MIB, p. 439]. Ultimately, it was necessary to strive to ensure that “the Kyrgyz people love Russia for Russia proper and little by little the rivers” [MIB, p. 447]. The search for ways to resolve these issues by representatives of the Orenburg administration proceeded in various, sometimes opposite, directions. One of them was proposed by P.I. Rychkov in a report with the characteristic title "The idea of the state of the Kirghiz-Kaisatsky hordes, and ways to bring them to a peaceful stay and to the performance of subordinate positions" (1774) [Archive of the St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 36. Op. 1. D. 438. L. 15v.]. It boiled down to the need to educate, first of all, the amanats - a likely reserve for the future bureaucratic apparatus from among the representatives of the traditional Kazakh nobility incorporated into Russian structures.
One of the means of realizing the strategic goals was the process of turning traditional titles into positions. The first step towards this was the formation of the financial dependence of a part of the Kazakh aristocracy on Russia. The second step was the development and bringing to the attention of applicants for the replacement of clear, very specific duties and powers of khans and sultans. They were obliged to take care of the protection of transit caravans, provide the provincial administration with information about the socio-political and economic situation in neighboring states, and promote security in the "border". In accordance with their official duties, they were responsible for their partial or complete failure to perform. So, for the loss of part of the property by the caravan, the sultans and the khan could lose part of their annual salary [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 36. Op. 1. D. 439. L. 33v. - 34, etc.], and for the insufficient provision of calm on the Russian-Kazakh "borders" and the raids of the Kazakhs on Russian settlements - positions [Archive of St. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 22. L. 47]. The first Orenburg Governor-General I.I. Neplyuev, justifying the expediency of Abulkhair’s removal, wrote about the possibility of rotation of khans and sultans: “If a khan who receives such a salary takes an evil intention, and it will be impossible to get and catch him, then he will immediately dismiss the salary determined for him and from the soltans of one reliable khan in his place and with a salary to determine ”[Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 63; AVPRI Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. F. 122. 1748. D. 3. L. 174-174v.]. On the contrary, the zealous performance of official duties by the Kazakhs was encouraged by an increase in the annual salary, the presentation of awards and transfer to other positions up to patronage when elected to the rank of khan. Of course, mutual gifts, a formal obligation to pay yasak were primarily a means of demonstrating the foreign policy dependence of the Kazakh rulers on Russia. However, it seems that from the very first moments of the formation of the imperial system, this was also an element of influence on the Kazakh population itself, the bulk of which perceived the first formal steps to join Kazakhstan to the Russian Empire very indifferently. The Russian side attached serious importance to this issue. A.I. Tevkelev, in particular, wrote that the Kazakhs, “hearing about such a salary [of Genghisides], admit that it is truly Russian citizenship” [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 63; AVPRI Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. F. 122. 1748 D. 3. L. 175].
The issue of assigning a regular regulated salary to Kazakh owners still requires its detailed study, since it sheds light on the formation of the mechanisms of the genesis and evolution of the colonial system of government of the Russian Empire. There were several points of view on this issue in the government. Initially, the prevailing opinion was that “it would not be worth determining the salary for the khan, since this would create a precedent, and the rulers of the Kalmyks and mountain peoples would demand the same” [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 64; AVPRI Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. F. 122. 1748. D. 3. L. 176]. The insistent requests of the Orenburg authorities, in the end, were supported on the condition that the involvement of Kazakh rulers in the service would increase Russia's trade turnover with the countries of Central Asia. Initially, the government considered the issuance of a salary precisely as a payment for service, and “although the khan himself is not obliged to come for an annual meeting (report - A.B.), he must send letters annually” [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 66; AVPRI Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. F. 122. 1748 D. 3. L. 177]. The payment of salaries to the Kazakh rulers, indeed, became a precedent, and such actions were also taken against the heterodox nobility of other ethnic groups of the empire, but this also contributed to the development of a new mechanism for co-opting allogenes into imperial structures and a certain unification of approaches to the implementation of interaction between the nobility of Orthodox and non-Orthodox peoples in composition of Russia.
The dependence of the Kazakh khans was emphasized by their confirmation by the Russian government, as well as the need to draw up periodic written reports, etc. This process was hampered by a number of objective circumstances: lack of experience in bureaucracy among the Kazakhs, low educational level, the problem of choosing the language of communication, and a number of others. In the gradually created administrative bodies, a lot of papers were accumulated, requiring the solution of issues, etc. Naturally, there was red tape and conditions for the flourishing of corruption. Great difficulties were associated with the high geographical mobility of the population, which made it difficult for the functioning of the fiscal and police systems, as well as with the differences in the mentality of the Russian officials and the bulk of Kazakh nomads. However, even these difficulties did not become an obstacle to the formation and development, qualitative and quantitative growth of the colonial bureaucratic apparatus in the Kazakh steppe.
After the death of Khan Abulkhair, Tevkelev wrote to the government that among the Kazakhs it was expedient “to solicit the chief khan by decree; because if one of them is made by decree, he can remember mercy. In addition, representatives of the Orenburg administration predicted that “from now on, that order will become a custom” [AVPRI MFA RF. F. 122. Kar.15. 1748 D. 8. L. 240]. The Russian authorities, during the elections for the khanate, sought to support the creatures of relatively weak, weak-willed sultans. They became puppets in the hands of the government and the provincial administration. If the Kazakhs elected a strong, masterful sultan, he was not recognized as such by the Russian authorities. This happened with the non-recognition of the sultans of Karatai, Aryngazy, Kaip-Gali, Kenesary, Abulgazy in the khan's dignity. Only eight years after the election, Ablai was approved in the rank of khan. The government needed executors of its will, in other words, bureaucrats, and not charismatic leaders, which were the khans by title. In parallel, the government continued to oppose each other both the dynastic branches of the Genghisides and individual sultans and khans. In one of the instructions of the middle of the XVIII century. it was noted that “their current form of government, due to the savagery of the people and the situation of both hordes (the Younger and Middle Zhuz - A.B.), for the highest e.i.v. interests is what it should always be. For the stronger the khans, the greater the difficulty in subduing them. It seems that the best way is to support them in their current measure, not allowing either side to either struggle or become very weak” [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 92-93; AVPRI Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. F. 122. Kar. 17. 1748. D. 3. L. 233v.].
The first experience of interference by the Russian authorities in the process of electing a khan by the Kazakhs was the election of a khan after the death of Abulkhair, who was killed by the Sultan of the Middle Zhuz Barak. The Russian authorities supported the candidacy of Abulkhair's eldest son, Sultan Nuraly. “It was necessary to choose a khan in his place (Abulkhair - A.B.), then in order for the new khan tol and as a loan to the local side, diligence was put into choosing the current Nurali Khan as a khan ... ”[Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 36. Op. 1. D. 439. L. 32]. He was officially approved for a salary of 600 rubles in silver, of which 400 rubles were secretly issued. As an attribute of power, a saber was handed over, and “200 rubles each were assigned to his two brothers Erali and Aichuvak Soltan ... Eralius recently ... [for] efforts in escorting caravans and another 150 rubles were added” [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology. F. 36. Op. 1. D. 439. L. 33]. Moreover, the Orenburg administration managed to get a written request from the khan to approve him in this dignity. On October 17, 1748, Nurali sent a letter addressed to the empress with the following content: “According to your advice ... all the noble biys gathered to become khans elected me, and although I remove this khan’s rule on myself, only without a special e.i.v. the highest decree to join the khanate and not be able to be the main khan ”[AVPRI MFA RF. F. 122. Kar. 17. 1748. D. 8. L. 21-21v.]. It is clear that for Nuraly this letter did not have the significance that the Russian authorities attached to this fact. Since, as T.I. Sultanov, the Kazakhs perceived joining under the protectorate of Russia as a reversible step, considering the possibility of its termination in a convenient case [Russia, the West and the Muslim East…, p. 19]. The Russian administration, however, proceeded from the norms of European law and subsequently used such official documents as a legal precedent that imposed obligations.
Nuraly's attempts to pursue a relatively independent foreign policy, which, to a certain extent, succeeded by his father and a number of other rulers, ran into opposition from the Russian authorities. This was expressed both in open confrontation and in the failure to provide assistance to the new khan in the implementation of his initiatives. For example, the Orenburg administration did not support the claims of the Khan of the Younger Zhuz (confirmed in the status of the Khan of the Kazakhs to maintain tension between the two branches of the Kazakh Chingizids - the Zhadigids and the Osekids) to receive the khan's dignity in Khiva and the Karakalpaks, did not provide assistance in his attempts to weaken the power of Batyr in the generation of the Alimuly of the Younger Zhuz and the power of Barak in the Middle Zhuz during the day, etc.
The authority of the khan in traditional Kazakh society largely depended on how successfully he contributed to the expansion of the range of nomads, the development of trade with neighboring settled regions, from where the nomads received the necessary agricultural products and handicraft goods, and also on how successful were his predatory raids. In the first years of his reign, Nuraly failed to fully demonstrate these qualities, as a result, his power was nominal. Fearing competition from the generation of Zhadigids, as well as seeking to expand trade relations with the Urals and Siberian settlements, Nuraly was objectively forced to look for ways to expand contacts with the Russian administration, in whose person he could find support for a number of his initiatives and the support of his own fragile power. For a long time, the Russian authorities maintained rather cool relations with Nuraly, relying on the sultans of the Middle Zhuz - first Barak, and then Ablai. The reason for this lay in the fact that the Middle Zhuz was more numerous, and the economic well-being of its population was higher. In addition, he occupied an important strategic position, being a certain soft buffer between Russia and Dzungaria, and after its defeat, between the Russian and Qing empires. In addition, the sultans of the Middle Zhuz largely controlled the caravan routes to Khiva and Bukhara [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 36. Op. 1. D. 438. L. 153].
The situation began to qualitatively change from 1755. The outbreak of the Bashkir rebellion forced the local Orenburg authorities to seek closer cooperation with the rulers of the Little Zhuz, primarily with Nuraly. The desire to improve relations was mutual. Governor General I.I. Neplyuev allowed the Kazakh sultans to rob and enslave the fugitive Bashkirs. In the "Extract on the Bashkirs", compiled by the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, it was noted that the Kazakhs of the Younger Zhuz "for the most part plundered the fugitive Bashkirs and their wives from their husbands, and separated the children from their fathers and mothers and thus made them captives, and between the Kirghis-Kaisaks themselves of one kind with another, fights and murders took place for them ... ”[Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 36. Op. 1. D. 439. L. 246]. The scale of the robbery can be judged, if only because on one day Nuraly handed over to Tekelev about 6 thousand slaves from the former captive Bashkirs [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 36. Op. 1. D. 439. L. 247v.]. In 1771, the Kazakhs were allowed to do the same in relation to the Volga Kalmyks who rebelled against Russia [Archive of St. Once. II. Op. 7. D. 3, 4]. In addition, in addition to other rewards for the performance of official duties (in this case, for the performance of police functions), in the winter of 1755, Kazakhs were allowed to cross to the right side of the Urals for winter roaming. This, on the one hand, increased the authority of the Abulkhairids. On the other hand, this was considered by the government as additional funding for the post of khan, since the government and local authorities did not resist the fact that Nuraly and his relatives introduced a regular one percent tax on the Kazakhs for driving cattle across the Urals [AVPRI Russian Foreign Ministry. F. 122. 1775-1786 L. 2. L. 189]. In order to limit the growth of Nuraly's popularity, various methods were used, including support for the anti-Kazakh speeches of other non-Russian groups of the empire [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 36. Op. 1. D. 439. L. 12v. - 15 about. etc.], and a ban on wandering in the Volga-Ural interfluve [Bykov A.Yu., 2003, p. 34-35].
The growing dependence of Nuraly on the Russian administration and his performance of administrative functions as the sender of the post of khan led to a weakening of his position in the traditional hierarchy and a fall in his authority, i.e. led to a certain limitation of his powers as a khan by rank, and to a large extent to the devaluation of the rank itself. Customary legal and institutional statuses and roles began to conflict in this case, which intensified over time. An example of the Khan's reaction to a change in the situation is his attempt to get the Russian authorities to approve his son Ishim (Yesim) as the heir. Modern jurists note that Kazakh customary law did not know inheritance by will and discretion of the heir [History of the state and law of the Kazakh SSR. Part 1, p. 73]. As rightly noted by A.I. Levshin, “this desire was new, but did not contradict the types of Russia” [Levshin A.I., p. 245]. In an effort to prevent any possibility of manifestation of separatism on the part of the khans, in the 1780s. O.A. Igelstrom proposed to simultaneously introduce the positions of three khans in the Younger Zhuz, proposing the descendants of Kaip as a candidate, establishing the rule of each in one of the tribal associations (alimuly, bayuly and zhetyru), and a little later came to the conclusion that it was necessary to completely abolish this position [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAN. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 22. L. 16-19, 45-50]. In 1785, Catherine II approved a proposal to eliminate the khan's power (positions of the Russian administrative and political hierarchy) in the Younger Zhuz with the wish that the Kazakhs become "accustomed to the direct leadership of our main military commanders there" [AVPRI MFA RF. F. 122. Op. 122/3. 1785 D. 2. L. 2v. – 3]. Khan Nuraly was invited to the line for a conversation, where he was detained and placed under house arrest in Ufa, where he died. As a formal explanation to the Kazakhs of such an act, the Russian authorities put forward the idea of protecting the interests of Sharua. In the report of O.A. Igelstrom to Catherine II, it was noted that “Nurali Khan, for the first 8 years of his reign, followed his father’s example, but already 30 years ago, separating from himself all the best elders, with whom he henceforth had agreement and advice, he does not care in the least about the welfare of the people, but still to the pleasure of his greed, he fixes various oppressions on it” [AVPRI MFA RF. F. 122. Op. 122/1. 1775-1786 D. 2]. Similar requests of the “common people” became the reason for the Russian authorities to restrict the powers of Vali Khan in the Middle Zhuz [Levshin A.I., p. 282] and the approval of Sultan Bukei (son of Sultan Barak), who ruled in parallel with the descendant of Ablai, in the khan's dignity.
On the initiative of O.A. Igelstrom, a khan's council was established, later - tribal reprisals and a number of other bodies, the leadership of which was also associated with the performance of certain tasks, the implementation of decisions of higher bodies of the provincial administration. The persons accepted for the post were representatives of the traditional Kara-Suyek nobility.
We agree with the opinion of A.B. Kamensky, in the Russian Empire of the XVIII century. “The rationalization of management on bureaucratic principles came into conflict with the desire of the state to reproduce and preserve the estate structure of the Western European type. Another trend aimed at optimizing and rationalizing management mechanisms based on the principles of cameralism led to the formation of an extensive bureaucratic apparatus” [Kamensky A.B., p. 5].
In the changed historical context at the turn of the 18th-19th centuries, the imposition of lexical concepts played a somewhat different role. Under the conditions of the beginning of the Great French Revolution, any encroachment on the existing foundations, and even more so on the power of the nobility and the monarchy, was severely suppressed. Attempts by O.A. Igelstrom to reform the management system of the Kazakhs, bringing it as close as possible to the provisions of the Institutions for the management of the provinces in 1775 [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 106. L. 11; Archive of SPb II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 73. L. 10 and others], in particular, the abolition of the supreme power of the khans, were interpreted by his opponents as an encroachment on the autocratic foundations. “It is characteristic that adjutant O.A. Igelstrom, Colonel Grankin, in a denunciation of his boss dated December 13, 1788, accused the governor-general of not noble, simple Kazakhs being chosen for the birth massacres” [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 106. L. 31]. Igelstrom was removed, the khan's power of the heirs of Abulkhair was restored. However, this did not lead to social stabilization. On the contrary, the reign of Yeraly and Ishim was associated with the intensification of the performances of the Kazakhs under the leadership of the batyr Srym Datov.
The government actually reversed its decision, returning Baron Igelstrom to his post. However, the khan's rule was restored, limited by new administrative bodies - the Khan's Council, the Border Courts and the Border Commission [Vyatkin MP, 1957]. The inconsistency of the Russian course on the issue of the need / inexpediency of maintaining the khan’s power led to an intensification of the split between the nobility of Kara- and Ak-Suyek: him Erali. Soon Ishim, and after the death of his current Aichuvak, and how the power was taken away from the beys, the people of Kirghiz, having become corrupt, not knowing whom to respect or whom to obey, were divided from each other ”[Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 179. Op. 1. D. 11. L. 3 rev. - four].
An interesting outline of the events of this time in the description of Major General Gens. In 1797, after the assassination of Khan Ishim by Srym, the question of a candidate for this post again arose. The choice of the Orenburg authorities fell on the son of Nuraly, Sultan Bukei. However, “Sultan Karatay, as his elder brother, considering himself offended, believing that he should be a khan, although Bukei was chosen by the people, who did not want to have a khan due to his (Karatai’s) hot temper. Karatay lured Bukei to his village and did not let him out until Baron Igelstrom decided to make the decrepit Aichuvak Khan, to which Karatay agreed, respecting his old age and hoping that he would die soon” [RGIA. F. 853. Op. 1. D. 236. 1844. L. 2].
In 1801, returning to Igelstrom's idea of creating several administrative units - khanates from the Kazakhs of the Little Zhuz, the Bukeev Horde was created, the khan of which in 1812 was approved by Sultan Bukei.
In Kazakh society, the title of Khan was for life. It was not accepted to give up the khanate. The existing evidence of 1762 by the translator F. Gordeev that “Khan Abulmambet, fearing an attack by the Chinese Empire, does not want to be a khan in Turkestan” [AVPRI MFA RF. F. 122. D. 14. L. 27 v.], in relation to the renunciation does not seem reliable. In this and similar cases, the information from the sources testifies only to the migration of the owner.
In 1805, Aichuvak, “due to his old age, was dismissed from the khanate, and his son Dzhantyurya Sultan was erected in his place” [RGIA. F. 853. Op. 1. D. 236. 1844 L. 3v. - four]. There is a version that the resignation (!) from the khanate, filed by Aichuvak, was falsified by Zhan-tore, who aspired to become a khan by any means. The official version of the dismissal of Aishuak in a letter to Chancellor A.R. Vorontsov dated September 15, 1805 was outlined by the Orenburg military governor G.S. Volkonsky, noting that the khan “due to the weakness of his health ... asked me to intercede at the throne of the monarch in the discussion of his dismissal from the khan's office; and the Sovereign Emperor, on May 26 of this year, on May 26 of this year, on this dismissal, most mercifully grant him a pension of 1,000 rubles a year after his death; and he deigned to elect a new khan in his place, deigning to appoint this dignity mainly to Sultan Dzhantyuru, the son of Aichuvak khan. The election was held according to the traditional rite "by the voluntary consent of all the ancestors and the people" with subsequent confirmation [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 22. L. 52-53]. Representatives of the Russian authorities gave a different interpretation a few years later: “The appointment of Dzhantyuri was made secretly, and only the baigushi (poor people - A.B.) who roamed near Orenburg declared their desire to have a khan by attaching their seals” [RGIA. F. 853. Op. 1. D. 236. 1844. L. 4].
Karatay did not recognize the power of the new khan and began to actively intrigue against him, as well as rob caravans passing through the steppe. Moreover, he achieved his own election as a khan by a part of the Kazakh elders, but was not recognized by the Russian government. The Orenburg military governor, Prince Volkonsky, considered, however, the possibility of making Karatay Khan of the Turkmens, but “he replied that he considered it indecent to leave his people and go to someone else. In 1809, Jantyurya was killed, probably on the orders of Karatay” [RGIA. F. 853. Op. 1. D. 236. 1844. L. 4 rev.]. Aishuak died in 1810. Karatay believed that now he would achieve confirmation, and temporarily stopped his armed actions, but he failed to achieve full disposition and trust from the Orenburg authorities, as a result, in 1812, Bukei and Shirgazy Aishuakov were proclaimed khans. Both were convenient, because "one will live in Russia, and the other is unable to govern the people" [RGIA. F. 853. Op. 1. D. 236. 1844. L. 5]. However, Shirgazy Aichuvakov managed to achieve the location of the ataman of the Ural army D. Donskov. The joint “military search” for supporters of the khan and the Cossacks of real, and more often imaginary state criminals in the steppe led to massive robberies of the Kazakh sharua and their dissatisfaction, both with the appointed khan and with the Russian authorities as a whole [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 22. L. 159-160]. This stimulated the growth in popularity of khans who were not approved by the Russian government.
In 1815, another contender for the title of khan appeared - Sultan Aryngazy Abulgaziev, Zhadigid, the grandson of the Khiva Khan Kaip and Sultan Batyr. In 1816, the Kazakhs of the Alimuly generation recognized him as Khan. The main pillar of his power was the strong and numerous clans of Chikly, Shumekey and Jagalbayly [RGIA. F. 1291. Op. 8. D. 44 b. 1811 L. 21-22]. This generation fought against the Khanate of Khiva, whose rulers tried to install Menenbai and Shirgazy Kaipov as khans among them. As already noted, under the conditions of a foreign political threat, the powers of the khan in the traditional society of Kazakh nomads increased sharply. In particular, Aryngazy received the right to apply the death penalty, introduced Sharia justice, strengthened the veneration of rank, introduced regular taxation, etc., bringing his own powers as close as possible to those of the royal ones.
Thus, in the second half of the second decade of the XIX century. in the Junior Zhuz there were two khans by rank - Karatai and Aryngazy, and two khans by position, respectively Bukei and Shirgazy Aichuvaks - from Russia, and Dzhingazy-Menenbai and Shirgazy Kaipov - from Khiva. It should be noted that Karatay and Aryngazy, albeit from different motives, both sought to institutionalize their position in the form of confirmation by the Russian government in rank. By the way, historians who do not take into account the peculiarities of that moment happen to confuse Shirgazy Aichuvakov and Shirgazy Kaipov.
Orenburg Governor-General P.K. Essen had to decide which side to support. On the one hand, he was obliged to preserve Russian political institutions, on the other hand, the struggle in the Younger Zhuz led to a sharp drop in trade turnover on the Orenburg market. According to customs reports, “the Kyrgyz exchange had already ceased altogether and the reason for this was strongly believed to be the attack and bloodshed perpetrated by the Khan on the Kyrgyz near Orenburg” [RGIA. F. 1291. Op. 8. D. 44 b. 1811 L. 184v.]. At the same time, the trade of the Siberian border towns with the Kazakhs of the Middle Zhuz intensified [Bykov A.Yu., 2003, p. 59-66]. Gradually, the general's sympathies began to lean towards Aryngazy.
On August 29, 1817, another appeal was received from the sultans and foremen of the Junior and Middle Zhuzs with a request to replace the khan. In particular, it said: “At one time, by the highest command, Sultan Shirgazy Aychuvakov was elected to the khans. Now, however, we see that there is no benefit from this ruler, for he makes indulgence to public thieves and allowed the Horde to be completely upset” [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 23. L. 159]. As an alternative candidate, the Kazakh foremen also proposed Aryngazy. There was also a danger that Aryngazy and the Kazakhs subordinate to him would become Khiva subjects. All this predetermined the final choice of P.K. Essen, who, in a secret report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated November 3, 1818, proposed to approve Sultan Aryngazy as the Khan of the Kazakhs of the Younger Trans-Ural Horde, Sultan Aryngazy, and to dismiss Khan Shirgazy Aychuvakov “from managing the Lesser Horde, assigning him and his family his stay in Ufa or Menzelinsk with a pension of 2000 rubles each for a year” [RGIA. F. 1291. Op. 8. D. 44 a. L. 3]. To raise the official status to confirmation, Aryngazy was proposed to be awarded with a golden saber on a blue ribbon with diamond decorations, “since there are ordinary foremen in the horde who have medals on blue ribbons” [RGIA. F. 1291. Op. 8. D. 44 a. L. 2v.]. In addition, it was proposed to stop quarrels with Karatay Nuraliev, who "took the intention to unite with ... Arungazi" [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 22. L. 135].
The governor's support for Aryngazy was expressed not only in external respect, but also in the fact that he was allowed to use the Russian troops who accompanied the mission of A.F. Negri to Bukhara, against the Khivans [VPR. Ser. 2. T. 3(11), 4(12)]. Essen managed to convince K.V. Nesselrode, who came with such a proposal to Emperor Alexander I. Despite all the persuasiveness of the arguments, for ethical reasons the emperor did not support the idea of deposing Shirgazy, noting in the margins of Nesselrode’s note that “the divinatory benefit promised from the removal of Khan Shirgazy cannot be compared with those positive benefits that should be expected from keeping in holiness the promise given by the highest imperial name to Khan Abulkhair, to keep the khan's dignity in his offspring ... ”[Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 22. L. 189].
The Orenburg Governor-General continued to insist on his own way out of the crisis in the Younger Zhuz. To clarify the situation on the spot, the government sent State Councilor Timkovsky (not to be confused with the head of the Trinity Customs) to the steppe. The inspector fell under the influence of the charm of Shirgazy Aichuvakov. Comparing the personal qualities of Khan Shirgazy and Sultan Aryngazy, Timkovsky denounced: “The quiet, slow and unenterprising spirit and great piety of the former, behavior unstained by any crime, remove from him any suspicion of any intention” [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 23. L. 209]. The auditor was mistaken, and Shirgazy at that time, as Essen reported, was conducting secret negotiations with Khiva [RGIA. F. 853. Op. 1. D. 236. L. 7 rev.].
V.F. Timkovsky accepted the point of Shirgazy. The letter of the latter with explanations of the events that had taken place was delivered to the emperor. It gave such an interpretation of the events that it followed that the Governor-General P.K. Essen and the president of the Orenburg Border Commission, Major General Veselitsky, who completely took the side of the "robber" Aryngazy and first introduced him to the Khan's Council, and then completely appointed him chairman of this authorized body "without any advice or consent from me ..." [Archive SPb II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 23. L. 197]. He also complained about the threats of removal from the khan's dignity, emanating from the highest Orenburg authorities, mentioning, among other things, that the claims of the authorities were reduced to the Khan's dishonest performance of his duties. Parrying such claims, the khan justified himself by the inconsistency of bureaucratic forms of government with nomadic life: “I can’t solve cases, since my people are nomadic, orders take a long time” [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 23. L. 199].
The complication of relations with Khiva predetermined the choice of the government in favor of Shirgazy Aychuvakov. Aryngazy was summoned to St. Petersburg in 1820 allegedly for confirmation, detained, and later exiled to Kaluga, where he died in 1833 [RGIA. F. 853. Op. 1. D. 236. 1844. L. 7 rev. - eight]. Even after the exile, Essen continued to insist on the return of Aryngazy and on raising him to the dignity of a khan. When this turned out to be unacceptable, he proposed to the government in his draft Charter on the Orenburg Kirghiz of 1822 to abolish the institution (position) of khan power in the Lesser Transural Horde altogether. The project was not accepted. It went through a long discussion, and only in January 1824, after revisions, a document was adopted called “The approved opinion of the Committee of Asian Affairs regarding the transformation of the administration of the Orenburg Territory” [MIIPS, p. 205-210].
The textual analysis of the document showed that it was not about the abolition of the institution of khan power in the traditional sense, i.e. not about the elimination of the title and title of khan, but specifically about the elimination of the post of khan, provided for by the Russian imperial hierarchy [Bykov A.Yu., 2000, p. 371-375]. The documents at our disposal now convincingly prove the B.M. Abdrakhmanova and us the hypothesis about the illegality of the established dating of the abolition of the institute of khan power in the Junior Kazakh zhuz in 1822 [Abdrakhmanova B.M.]. The reason is the same here - the researchers confused the title of khan with the homonym position. Khan, indeed, was invited to Orenburg and made Honorary First Present of the Orenburg Border Commission. He was given a new salary of 600 rubles. However, there was no talk of removing the khan's title from him in the documents. On the contrary, in correspondence, appeals during personal meetings, etc. Shirgazy Aichuvakov continued to be called Khan. It was specially emphasized that “for greater convenience [of exercising powers] in these relations, establish for the khan his permanent residence in Orenburg, with the title of First Present in the Border Commission ... By these means and respectful treatment, all external honors are preserved for the khan, and in essence the main influence on the Horde will have The Orenburg authorities through the senior sultans” [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 23. L. 425]. Moreover, for some time the issue of restoring the khan's position continued to be considered, provided that the Trans-Ural and Bukeev hordes were divided into two parts. In a letter to K.V. Nesselrode P.K. Essen noted that it was necessary to strengthen the executive power in the steppe. “To achieve this, it is necessary that each part of the Horde should be given a special khan and under his authority the Steppe Administration with a senior sultan in charge of police affairs ... to raise those of the aforementioned senior sultans to them” [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 23. L. 354].
Shirgazy did not want to put up with the status of a puppet khan in the rank of not charged with any powers. He demanded to build for himself a fortification in the steppe and to allocate a military unit "for action against the recalcitrant." Of interest is the argumentation of the Khan's desire to get out of the direct control of the Orenburg administration. In an appeal to K.V. Neselrode Khan noted that “I, being born in the Kirghiz-Kaisak steppe, continued my stay, roaming through the green young grass decorated with flowers and flowing rivers and channels. In a word, in free and pleasant air; I don’t like the air that exists in the real city of Orenburg, and I continue my living in it not willingly, but under compulsion” [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 23. L. 430]. Further in the letter, he asked to transfer the headquarters with the senior sultans subordinate to him to the steppe.
After receiving permission to leave, the khan did not return within the time period set by the Orenburg administration [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 23. L. 504]. Moreover, he sent his sons Idig and Mendiyar to the Khan of Khiva on a secret mission. According to the reports of the Russian authorities, from Khiva the purpose of this mission was the approval of Shirgazy as Khan [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 23. L. 490].
Moreover, in 1827, Khan Shirgazy tried to visit Khiva himself, but was detained by Kazakhs from the Chikla clan. The Russian authorities once again entered the government with a proposal to return Aryngazy, who had great authority in the Alimulin generation [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 23. L. 490]. Temir Eraliev, who was sent to this generation by the senior sultan, voluntarily resigned due to the impossibility of fulfilling orders due to sabotage by the Alimuly people [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 23. L. 435-436]. But once again, the provincial authorities were refused. True, now the government has made some concessions to the Orenburg authorities. As early as 1823, Essen suggested that Aryngazy be returned to the Younger Zhuz as the sultan-ruler of the Middle Part of the Horde [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 3]. The Asiatic Committee, by a decision of September 8, 1826, appointed his brother, Sultan Arda, to this position, explaining: “... Whose behavior and measures he takes to introduce a device and restore calm, will depend on the speedy dispatch of his Arungasia to the horde” [RGIA. F. 1291. Op. 8. 1823 D. 95. Part II. L. 100-101v.].
Having reached the limits of Khiva, Shirgazy was warmly received by the Khiva ruler and approved in the dignity of a khan. From Khiva, he begins to actively intrigue, agitating the Kazakhs to secession from the Russian Empire [RGIA. F. 1291. Op. 8. 1823 D. 126. 1827 L. 3-4 rev.; Archive of SPb II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 22. L. 492, 529-531]. And at the same time, he continued to be called the Khan of the Kazakhs by the Russian administration until October 7, 1833 [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 22. L. 504].
It should be noted that the imposition of concepts also had the opposite effect, when individual Kazakhs, striving to receive the title of khan, sought approval in the post. Thus, the above-mentioned Sultan Karatay Nuraliev fought for several years for recognition as a khan. “... When the Russian government, during the abolition of the khan’s power in the Lesser Horde in 1823, appointed him as the sultan the ruler of the Western part, it found in Karatay a zealous and loyal agent in its colonial policy” [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 106. L. 66]. As archival materials show, one of the main merits of Karatai, according to the Orenburg authorities, was that he was the first to attract Kazakhs to the regular performance of police functions by Kazakhs [RGIA. F. 853. Op. 1. D. 236. L. 19]. From the second quarter of the 19th century Kazakhs often began to consider the position (no longer khan's) as a title (actually khan's!). The following example is even more indicative in this respect. December 5, 1833 Orenburg Governor-General V.A. Perovsky wrote to the director of the Asian Department, K.K. Rodofinikin about the proclamation of himself by Sultan Kusyak-Ali as Sultan-ruler of the Western part of the Younger Horde, i.e. he began to consider this position as an analogue to the rank of khan (!) [Archive of the St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 115-116]. The same situation was typical for the Middle Zhuz. The materials of the First Siberian Committee demonstrate that after the abolition of the khan's power here according to the Charter on the Siberian Kirghiz of 1822, the sultans sought to secure for themselves in hereditary form the title (namely the title!) of the senior sultan. The Russian authorities could not go for the devaluation of the official concept, but in return for the loss of the khan's title, at the suggestion of the West Siberian Governor-General Gorchakov, the direct descendants of the khans Ablai and Bukei were granted princely dignity (title, rank) [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 18]. Proposed in 1830 by General Velyaminov, a draft of a new Statute on the Siberian Kirghiz, which included provisions on the hereditary power of senior sultans and the election of officials exclusively from among the Genghisides, was rejected by the First Siberian Committee [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 43-49]. In the Younger Zhuz, the first precedent for raising to the princely dignity was the granting of this title to the widow of Khan Abulkhair Khanshe Popai.
In another part of the Younger Zhuz - the Inner or Bukey Horde (Khanate), the process of devaluing the khan's title and turning it into a position that was abolished was in many respects similar to the processes in the Trans-Ural Horde. After the death in 1815 of Sultan Bukei, who left a will approved by the council of sultans and elders [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 106. L. 57] (which was uncharacteristic for the customary legal practice of the Kazakhs) in the name of his minor son Sultan Dzhangir, the brother of Bukei, Sultan Shigay, began to rule the khanate, striving to keep this position for himself. To do this, he “in February 1822 ... reported to the Orenburg military governor that this latter (Dzhangir - A.B.) was spreading rumors in the Horde that he, having a paper from his superiors for the rank of khan, was forcing the Kyrgyz ancestors to apply their seals to the paper of this and through this causes disorder in the Horde, which, according to the information collected later, turned out to be false ”[RGIA. F. 853. Op. 1. D. 236. 1844. L. 8]. It is significant that Sultan Dzhangir also appealed not to traditional institutions, but to the Russian authorities, justifying himself before the Russian authorities and accusing his uncle of treachery [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 23. L. 371]. The final decision on the new ruler was made by the Saratov and Astrakhan governors-general, who both spoke in favor of the young, Russian-educated Dzhangir, who “by his qualities won respect and power of attorney not only among the Kyrgyz, but also from Russian residents” [RGIA. F. 1291. Op. 8. D. 5. 1801. L. 105v.].
Kaip-Gali Ishimov also claimed the khan's dignity. In 1828, he organized the migration of part of the Kazakhs of the Bukeev Khanate to the Trans-Ural steppe. After some time, he was captured and, giving explanations, he emphasized that he was “ready, according to the oath taken, to serve H.I.V. as it should be according to the laws” [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 3]. The Russian authorities did not approve Kaip-Gali in the rank of khan, but the Khiva khan Allakul did it in 1836 [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 146-147]. But already in 1841, the newly-minted Khan refused this title and fussed with the Orenburg military governor V.A. Perovsky about the amnesty [Archive of St. Petersburg Institute of Science and Technology, Russian Academy of Sciences. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 26. L. 172-173].
Even after the death of Khan Dzhangir in 1845, the khan's power in the Inner Horde was not abolished. Despite the fact that the horde itself was transferred to the departmental subordination of the Ministry of State Property, the Kazakhs of the Inner Horde did not pay taxes to the Russian government for some time [Blaramberg I.F., p. 215]. Khan until his death was the son of Jangir - Sahib Giray. He was granted a princely title. Emperor Nicholas I "expressed a preliminary consent to the approval of the eldest son of Khan Dzhanger, Sahib-Girey, the heir to the khan's dignity after his course in the Corps of Pages" in St. Petersburg. Just before the graduation from the page corps, the Minister of State Property, Count Kiselev, came up with the initiative to abolish the khan's office. Sahib-Girey was seconded to the Orenburg military Obruchev with the condition that, upon reaching adulthood, he would lead the Horde, but not as a khan, but as a ruler. In 1849 Sahib Giray died suddenly. Plans to preserve the possibility of the post of khan existed until 1852, when the page corps graduated from the youngest son of Dzhangir - Ibrahim, who was also granted the princely title, but he and his relatives were removed from the management of the Horde, but Ibrahim's descendants received hereditary princely dignity, becoming one of the the highest tribal elite of the Russian Empire.
1849 became the chronological boundary of the actual abolition of the post of khan in the Russian administrative and political hierarchy in the Kazakh steppe. Proposals to restore this institution sometimes came later, but were rejected by the government. The last of the proposals of this kind known to us was submitted for discussion in the post-reform era, or rather on January 31, 1863, and was called "Consideration on the transformation of management among the lineage of the Orenburg department of the Kirghiz." Based on the results of the discussion, a peremptory conclusion was made: “the khans and the people in the steppe not only do not constitute an organic whole, but have completely different, even opposite interests, and that the existence of the khans is positively harmful, both for the Kyrgyz people themselves and regarding Russia’s views on this people » [Archive of St. Petersburg II RAS. F. 267. Op. 1. D. 28. L. 76]. Before the reform of 1868, such a body as the Khan's Council was formally preserved in the Inner Horde, but it acted as a county body "as a purely judicial and administrative board" [RGIA. F. 853. Op. 1. 1857. D. 58. L. 2]. After this date, the Khan's Council was renamed the Provisional Council for the Management of the Inner Kirghiz Horde, which existed with this name until the collapse of the Russian Empire.
According to the same scheme, but with significant differences in details, the question of the abolition of the khan's power in the Middle Zhuz was resolved. Its analysis is of interest, including in terms of a possible comparative study, but is not the subject of this article. We confine ourselves to the remark that, perhaps, the first attempt to transform a rank into a position here was the proposal of the Russian authorities in 1759-1760. Ablai in his confirmation [Suleimenov R.B., Moiseev V.A., p. 93-94] during the lifetime of Abulmambet, acting, but having lost his actual power. However, Ablai refused and was approved in the rank of khan only in 1780, nine years after he was raised on a white felt mat. However, the Russian authorities did not stop trying to turn the rank into a position, the condition for which was to increase the personal dependence of the khans on the government and the Siberian provincial authorities. Just like the rulers of the Little Zhuz, the Kazakh sultans and khans of the Middle Zhuz were paid salaries by the government. According to the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers of June 7, 1739, Khan Abulmambet, as well as the sultans Barak and Ablai [RIO. T. 126, p. 515, 547-548]. The proclamation of Ablai's heir, Sultan Vali Khan, in 1781, which took place independently of the imperial administration, was recognized as erroneous [VPR. Ser. 2. T. 4(12), p. 282]. Moreover, in his letter to Empress Catherine II, he undertook obligations to “exterminate thieves” among the Kazakhs [KRO-2, p. 108]. Although in order to him, according to information transmitted by I. Shangin from the words of Sultan Khuday-Menda, the sultans, foremen and mullahs demanded that “the khan during his reign should follow exactly the rites and customs of his ancestors” [TsHAF AK. F. 1. Op. 2 additional D. 85. L. 158v.].
In parallel with Khan Vali, in 1812, Sultan Bukei, a descendant of Sultan Barak, was approved as Khan among part of the Kazakhs of the Middle Zhuz (the Naiman generation and a number of other clans). They became the last khans of the Middle Zhuz (Middle Horde) officially recognized by the Russian administration. Moreover, they were already approved not so much in rank as in position. The fact that they did not have real power can be judged by the repeated appeals of the Kazakhs to the Russian administration with a request to save them from the unpopular khans [Kuzembay-uly A., Abilev E., p. 195-196]. Later, the government acknowledged the fact of imposing a candidate on the Kazakhs. In one of the documents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (1868) one can read: “Establishing the khans in a certain family, we also went against the inherent Kyrgyz (Kazakh - A.B.) principle of freedom of choice and their fundamental beliefs in the dignity of the generic meaning and personal qualities” [TsGA RK. F. 64. Op. 1. D. 151. L. 101v.].
With the death of Bukei and Vali in 1817 and 1819. accordingly, the post of Khan of the Middle Horde was abolished. The Charter of 1822 did not provide for the post of khan. For some time, the Russian authorities still considered the possibility of appointing Gabaydulla, the younger brother of Khan Vali, as khan, but abandoned their intention, citing the unpopularity of the sultan and the fact that the traditional rite of choosing a khan by the Kazakhs “at a commemoration, among ordinary steppe feasts, may seem to be another distant not quite solid” [VPR. Ser. 2. T. 4(12), p. 282–283]. With regard to Gabaydulla, the Siberian authorities proposed to act similarly to what they had done with respect to Karatay in the Younger Zhuz, appointing him as the sultan-ruler. The Russian authorities hoped that Gabaydulla was content with the rank of colonel and the post of senior sultan of the Kokchetav outer district. The corresponding decree was given to A. Grigorovsky, who was preparing the opening of the district [Abuev K.K., p. 4-5], however, the descendant of Khan Ablai turned to the Qing government with a request to recognize him as the Khan of the Kazakhs, and the Russian authorities wrote a letter notifying them of his death [Strelkova I., p. 15-16]. Gabaidulla was approved by the Chinese court in the dignity of a khan, but when he tried to meet with Chinese envoys, he was arrested by the Russian authorities [Moiseev V.A., 1991, p. 48-51; Erofeeva I.V., 1997, p. 92-93, 135-136]. Later he was sent into exile in Berezov, where he lived until 1848, when he was given an amnesty in connection with the end of the movement of his relative Kenesary Kasymov and the official renunciation of the rank of khan [Abuev K.K., Bekseitova A.T., b. 57-58]. A number of high-ranking Russian officials tried to woo khans and other sultans. So, the Orenburg military governor V.A. Perovsky considered it expedient to recognize Sultan Kenesary as Khan. However, the government approved the opinion of the West Siberian Governor-General Gorchakov, who considered such a measure harmful to the interests of the government [Bekmakhanov E.B., p. 244-249]. One of the high-ranking officials who supported the initiatives of the Orenburg authorities was the head of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs K.K. Rodofinikin proposed, in contrast to Kenesary, to recognize as a khan one of the two senior sultans of the outer districts of the Omsk region - T. Chingisov or A. Gabbasov, but his initiatives were also rejected by Emperor Nicholas I [Tilegenova L.T., b. 73-74].
Thus, attempts to achieve recognition as khans, undertaken by the descendants of Ablai, did not lead to the desired result. The last khan raised on a white felt mat in Turkestan according to the traditional rite was Kenesary Kasymov, who achieved such an honor in 1841. After his death in 1847, attempts to proclaim one of the sultans as a khan were no longer made. With regard to the elimination of the nominal khan's power, as we see, there was an almost complete synchronism in the flow of processes in the Junior and Middle Kazakh zhuzes. Their coordination undoubtedly reflects the position of the St. Petersburg cabinet and the emperor.
The last attempt to proclaim a khan without confirmation was the election of Abdulgafar, one of the leaders of the Turgai Kazakh uprising in 1916, as a khan. degradation of perception of ak-suyek by sharua.
So, the inclusion of the Kazakhs of the Younger and Middle Zhuzes into the Russian Empire required the combination of traditional potestary and new state institutions. For a long time they coexisted, complementing each other and performing various functions. However, gradually, for various reasons, but to a large extent due to the performance of these roles by the same persons, these structural elements of the socio-political organization began to overlap each other. The result of this overlap was confusion, reflected in the incorrect assessment of certain events, both by contemporaries and descendants. In this article, for example, the dating of the abolition of the khan's power in the Trans-Ural Horde was clarified. The date of abolition cannot be considered the approval of the Opinion of the Asian Committee, as a significant part of the researchers and even some of the contemporaries believed. The official recognition of the existence of the institute of khan power in the traditional sense (potestar structure) continued for another 9 years, until 1833. Moreover, it was Shirgazy Aichuvakov who was mentioned in the rank of khan, dismissed in 1824 from the khan's position, in connection with the abolition of such and redistribution functions between members of the Orenburg Border Commission and the institution of sultans-rulers (senior sultans).
For various reasons, the authority of traditional management structures was gradually undermined and replaced by institutional ones. In this case, the imposition of lexical concepts not only introduced confusion, but also facilitated the process of expanding the scope of state bodies, acting as a kind of psychological shock absorber for possible negative social consequences caused by the processes of political modernization. The parallel existence of potestary and state institutions of the same name became impossible in the middle of the 19th century, when the Russian government made the final decision to eliminate these positions and transfer their powers to other administrative bodies. Surprisingly, at the same time, this contributed to the decline of traditional institutions, the senders of which sought to incorporate themselves into new bodies, believing in this way to retain their former status. Together, this contributed to the decline of the potestary system, the loss of a number of its integral functions and the inclusion of many customary legal institutions in the judicial-legal and executive imperial system, as well as the bureaucracy of traditional titles and their transformation into official positions. In the end, this paved the way for the unification of the system of government within a single imperial space by abolishing atypical positions and titles. At the same time, one cannot speak of the complete completion of this process in the period before the collapse of the Russian Empire (February 1917). Traditional institutions continued to function actively at the lower taxonomic levels of social organization, forming a conglomerate with official institutions.
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